States have agreed to pursue ambitious environmental goals such as limiting the rise in global average temperature, halting the loss of biodiversity, protecting the oceans, curbing land degradation, and preventing pollution. In implementing these common objectives, some states take measures that have extraterritorial effects. These impacts sometimes lead to criticism from affected countries, which feel that their interests are being violated or neglected. This article analyzes the potential extraterritorial effects of the European Union’s Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) and assesses the complaints lodged by Indonesia against it. It will use the development of the EUDR as a case study to learn about the issues arising from environmental measures with extraterritorial effects designed to implement internationally agreed environmental objectives. It will also attempt to draw some general conclusions on how states can unilaterally advance these goals while respecting the legitimate interests of third countries.

This article examines how the identification and assessment (I&A) of adverse environmental impacts (AEI) within corporate value-chain due diligence (VCDD) norms under the Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is normatively designed, and how it can be distinguished from similar legal requirements that already bind corporations to perform environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Through a systematic analysis of specific instances of National Contact Points (NCPs), the article investigates how these expectations have been interpreted and applied in practice in environmental disputes raising claims concerning the I&A due diligence stage. The findings highlight inconsistencies in how NCPs handle such claims and showcase the interpretative divergences concerning the ways in which they perceive the interplay between these VCDD expectations and other host-state legal requirements that bind corporations to conduct assessments of environmental impacts. Based on the analysis, the article then reflects on the specificities of I&A expectations, as well as on avenues for future research. The research argues that VCDD requirements for corporations to identify and assess adverse environmental impacts should be interpreted as setting independent normative commands that warrant a specific compliance assessment. The article concludes by issuing recommendations concerning the ways in which I&A expectations should be interpreted in practice to avoid blurring the boundaries between two distinct layers of home- and host-state regulation.

The World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the Pandemic Agreement in May 2025. The contentious Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system was incorporated as an Annex, to be negotiated at a later date. Access and benefit-sharing (ABS) was introduced into international environmental law to make access to genetic resources conditional on, or ‘linked’ to, the sharing of benefits associated with using those resources. The negotiation for a multilateral PABS system represents a continuation of more than 30 years of ABS discussions, negotiations, diplomacy, and scholarly literature in international environmental law. This article takes a closer look at the term ‘delinking’, which was frequently used in the three years of negotiations for the Pandemic Agreement. We find that the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’ have been used interchangeably to refer to at least three different scenarios in the operationalization of multilateral ABS models: where the country of origin of the materials is not necessarily the recipient of benefits; where the type and quantity of benefits are not linked to the use of a specific sample of genetic resources, or in situations that combine these two models. We propose an ‘ABS Modalities Spectrum’ as a useful tool for assessing ‘delinking’ proposals. Our analysis serves as a reminder to WHO member states about to embark on negotiations for the PABS Annex that multilateral ABS systems exist on a spectrum, and do not have to default to the contract-based multilateral models that have been favoured to date.

The emergence of remotely operated vessels introduces new players, such as remote operators, into the shipping industry. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is working to incorporate these concepts into its regulatory framework. Given the significant responsibilities expected of remote operators, their liability for oil pollution and their role in marine environment protection require careful examination. The IMO is reviewing whether remote operators should be protected under the ‘channelling of liability’ provision in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992, which shields certain parties from negligence claims. While this provision may simplify the process of assigning liability, it has been criticized for weakening incentives to protect the marine environment. This article examines two options for the IMO: (i) leaving the status of remote operators undefined, allowing courts to interpret if they fall within the provision, or (ii) explicitly clarifying their status. The former is assessed through treaty interpretation and domestic case law, highlighting risks of legal uncertainty. The latter is explored by evaluating policy considerations and tools that could strengthen incentives for protecting the marine environment.

This article examines the hybrid network structure of the global sustainability governance system, focusing on the evolving relationships between private transnational regulators (PTRs) and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). We argue that a defining feature of this structure is the mutual dependence between PTRs and IOs: PTRs invoke public international law instruments (PILIs) – and, by extension, the authority of the IOs behind them – to bolster their own authority and to enhance the normative force of the standards they promulgate. IOs rely on PTRs to disseminate their norms within corporate settings, thereby strengthening their compliance capacities. This interdependence carries significant synergistic potential. We examine the grounding relationship between PTRs and PILIs/IOs through extensive network analysis based on a specially curated dataset comprising 55 PTRs, 393 private standards, 261 PILIs (including treaties, conventions, and declarations), and 41 IOs. Citation patterns within this network support our thesis. We also offer tentative evidence regarding the second prong of our model and outline directions for future research. Finally, we assess the vulnerabilities of this interdependent structure, highlighting the fragility of the global sustainability legal order in the face of rising nationalism and anti-multilateralist pressures.

This article argues that an emerging body of ‘target laws’ – legislation that incorporates binding, quantified environmental targets with specified deadlines – represents a crucial evolution in environmental governance. Whereas traditional environmental risk regulation was valuable for managing discrete environmental impacts, it has proven inadequate to address systemic challenges like climate breakdown and ecosystem collapse. Target laws, by contrast, are better equipped to deliver the transformative change needed to respond to systemic threats. Drawing on examples from climate legislation and the European Union’s Nature Restoration Law, the analysis demonstrates how target laws can overcome environmental law’s persistent vulnerabilities to short-termism, marginalization, and public obscurity. However, targets are paradoxical entities that inject considerable complexity into legal frameworks, creating novel challenges around temporality, legal status, implementation, and enforceability. While acknowledging these formidable difficulties, the article contends that target laws merit vigorous defence as they offer environmental legislation unprecedented dynamism, resilience, and transformative potential.

Ecological restoration is increasingly recognized as essential for combating the biodiversity and climate crises. However, restoration activities can also produce or exacerbate social and environmental injustices. This article explores the extent to which the European Union’s 2024 Nature Restoration Regulation (NRR) enables ‘just ecological restoration’. Drawing on the three dimensions of environmental justice – distributive, recognitional, and procedural – we assess whether the NRR adequately includes justice considerations. Our analysis finds that while the Regulation includes several justice-relevant provisions, many are implicit and lack enforceable guarantees. Disparities in expected costs and benefits raise concerns over distribution, limited safeguards may exclude marginalized communities, and participation mechanisms vary across Member States. The potential of the NRR to foster fair and inclusive restoration depends largely on how Member States implement their national restoration plans and whether the European Commission provides clear guidance and support to ensure socially responsible action.

Policymakers often cite a need to balance, or trade off, the protection and restoration of the natural environment on the one hand, and the extractive use of the environment for economic reasons on the other. This tension is inherent in the goal of ‘sustainable development’, which, despite providing a conceptual basis for Western environmental and conservation law, has also been criticized for legitimizing socio-ecologically destructive practices. This tension comes to the fore in the New Zealand government’s Fast-track Approvals Act 2024, which, to prioritize economic development interests, circumvents prior environmental and conservation law safeguards, as well as constitutional protection for the rights of Indigenous Māori. We undertook a contextual legal analysis of the fast-track legislation, demonstrating how it works to undermine conservation outcomes and Indigenous rights. Our findings hold particular significance for scholarly and policy debates about transnational environmental law, especially the contribution of Indigenous knowledge and law in a multi-level governance context. We argue that centring relationality in environmental law frameworks might help to shift away from binary approaches to environmental law, which trade off economic versus environmental and cultural interests.