The fundamental objective of the negotiations on agriculture that are taking place in the Doha Round is to establish a new set of rules, which will correct current distortions and prevent future distortions in international markets for agricultural products while taking into account non-trade concerns and special and differential treatment. A summary of the chronology of the very slow progress to date in the negotiations is provided. This rate of progress is explained through considering the weights the different groups of governments are giving to removing trade distortions, on the one hand, and to non-trade concerns and special and differential treatment, on the other. Some results from the economic theory of distortions and welfare are used to explain the conditions under which the twin pursuits of non-trade concerns domestically and fairness internationally are compatible. These results are contrasted with the realities of the current negotiations on the agriculture component of the ‘July 2004 package’.

Three times since its founding in 1948, the GATT/WTO has turned to outside experts for help in finding solutions to pressing issues confronting the multilateral trading system. In 1957 the Contracting Parties decided to create a panel of three (later four) internationally recognized experts in international trade and finance to consider trends in world trade, andin particular the failure of the trade of the less developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of industrialized countries, excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary products, and widespread resort to agricultural protection.

Professor Robert Emil Hudec (Fletcher School, Tufts University) passed away last week. He belonged, together with Professor John H. Jackson of Georgetown University Law Center and Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann of University of Geneva, Faculty of Law, to the first generation of legal scholars who founded and developed the branch of international law known as international economic law, centering on the study of world trade rules negotiated in the World Trade Organization.

On August 17, 1993, the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) imposed definitive countervailing duties (CVDs) on carbon steel originating in Germany. The imposition of these duties was based on an investigation by USDOC in which it was determined that certain German producers had benefited from five countervailable subsidy programs at a total ad valorem rate of 0.60 percent.

Some of the legal analysis in this study derives from joint work between Robert Howse and Susan Esserman on this ruling, ‘Trade disputes quire fairer arbitration’, FT.com, September 12, 2002

The WTO Consultative Report, dubbed the ‘Sutherland Report’ (the Report), was released on 17 January 2005 in an attempt to identify the WTO's institutional challenges, to provide non-binding recommendations from eminent persons, and thus to trigger a ‘process of reflection’. While these challenges (and criticism) vary, they are inextricably linked to the fundamental question of the legitimacy of WTO as a system, not necessarily as a mere gathering of 148 Members. In fact, the question has hotly been debated ever since the WTO's creation, generating a great deal of debates and reactions among scholars and politicians alike.

There is growing concern over the use of domestic product regulations as technical barriers to trade on the one hand, and the WTO's incursion into domestic regulatory autonomy on the other. The TBTA seeks to balance competing interests – acknowledging but disciplining Members' regulatory control over traded goods. The effectiveness of these disciplines is limited by the exclusion of many modern domestic regulations from the scope of the TBTA; the surest way to prevent abuse of process-based product specifications is to subject them to the TBTA's disciplines. The WTO dispute settlement tribunals have affirmed the importance of the use or adoption of international standards. While Members are still entitled to introduce their own measures in some circumstances, the emphasis on international standards raises the status of standard-setting bodies. Despite their important new role, the composition, accountability, and decision-making procedures have so far escaped the kind of civil society scrutiny to which WTO deliberations are now subject. To achieve the TBTA's harmonization objectives, the development, and use of international standards and their legal recognition within the WTO regime should be revised to safeguard legitimate non-trade regulatory objectives.

In United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities (WTO Doc. WT/DS212/QB/R, henceforth Certain Products), the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization was called upon to revisit the issue of whether the United States can legally impose countervailing duties following the privatization of state-owned enterprises that had received non-recurring subsidies. In twelve cases, the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) had applied either the “gamma method” or the “same-person method” in assessing the impact of a change of ownership on the continued existence of a benefit from a countervailable subsidy. The European Communities challenged the legality of these methods.

When the WTO was created as an outcome of the Uruguay Round, one of the major differences from its predecessor, the GATT, was the addition of new areas of rules of trade. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and to some extent also the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) added sets of rules that were entirely new. By adding trade in services, the rules of the multilateral trade organization now encompass trade in all produced goods and services. The WTO rules, however, encompass neither the international movements of capital or labour, nor other non-trade policies, such as those relating to the environment, labour standards, and competition policy, with minor exceptions.

This panel report represents another installment in the long-standing litigation between Canada and Brazil over subsidization of sales of commuter jets by both countries. The report addresses a set of claims by Brazil closely related to prior claims concerning the practices of the Export Development Corporation as well as industrial policy entities in the Canadian province of Quebec. Brazil specifically challenged certain recent transactions where these federal and provincial entities provided certain kinds of financing assistance in connection with the sale of Bombardier aircraft (namely to Air Wisconsin, Atlantic Coast Airlines, Comair, Kendell, and Air Nostrum). For the most part the panel applied existing jurisprudence on export subsidies to the factual record. In particular, the panel applied a “private investor principle”, verifying in all instances whether the conditions that were granted by the export development and industrial policy agencies were more favorable than the conditions that were available from alternative private sources.

In late 2004, the Consultative Board to the WTO Director General issued its report, ‘The Future of the WTO: Addressing the Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’. As noted by the Director General in the foreword, a rationale for the report was that ‘there had been too little serious thinking on whether the institutional design and practice that had served the GATT so well would do the same for the WTO’. One of the specific questions raised was ‘Could the WTO with an enlarged membership at various levels of development continue to deliver results?’ (p. 2). The following reflection on the Consultative Board's report is motivated by the latter question, where ‘results’ is defined as promoting not just global economic welfare, but the development prospects of poor members.

This arbitration on the level of countermeasures, pursuant to Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 22.6, originates from findings against the United States with respect to a provision of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, which permits a private cause of action for treble damages against an alleged dumping importer or producer where the dumping meets certain criteria, notably including a predatory intention. An unusual feature of this case is that, apparently, the provision in question had not yet been used against the EC, the complainant. In any case, the provision in question was found to be in violation of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, both because it would impose measures on dumping other than and in addition to anti-dumping duties, and because in so doing the procedural requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement would not be followed.

This dispute concerns the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure by the United States on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe (“line pipe”) from Korea (WTO DOC. WTO/DS 202/AB/R). The measure was imposed following an investigation conducted by the US International Trade Commission (USITC). The USITC determined in a safeguard investigation initiated on 29 July 1999 that “circular welded carbon quality line pipe . . . is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat of serious injury.” In its investigation, the USITC identified a number of factors apart from increased imports that might have caused serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic line pipe industry. The Commission concluded that increased imports were “a cause which is important and not less than any other cause” and that, therefore, the statutory requirement of “substantial cause” had been met.

This comment will focus primarily on the Sutherland Report's analysis of and recommendations for the WTO dispute settlement system. Before turning to the specific issue of dispute settlement, however, it is necessary to make a few introductory remarks regarding the objectives of the Sutherland Report, as well as its view of the future role of the WTO, including the dispute settlement system, in the international political system.

This study addresses the dispute brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by Argentina concerning certain Chilean measures affecting the importation of wheat, wheat flour, oil seeds, edible vegetable oils and sugar. The complaint by Argentina challenged two types of policies – a “price band system” that was applicable to four of those product categories, and safeguards measures that were applicable to three of them. The WTO panel ruled in favor of Argentina on both sets of measures. It found that the price band system violated Article IV of the Agriculture Agreement and Article II of GATT 1994. The safeguards measures, according to the panel, violated various provisions of the Safeguards Agreement, as well as Article XIX of GATT 1994. Chile elected not to appeal the panel ruling regarding the safeguards measures, but did appeal the adverse finding as to the price band system.

Trade policy today extends its influence well beyond what has traditionally been the grist of those interested in international trade policy. Many domestic regulations relating to patents, financial services, subsidies, and support measures for agriculture are subject to WTO disciplines. Some WTO agreements raise ethical questions about the patenting of life forms, precaution and risk management, access to essential medicines, and the rewarding of indigenous peoples for their genetic resources. There are negotiations on the legitimacy of fishing subsidies that lead to fish stock depletion and recent disputes have dealt with internet gambling, genetically modified organisms and the conservation of endangered species.

This study addresses the disputes brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the European Communities and the United States concerning certain Indian measures affecting the importation of automobiles and components in the form of “completely knocked down” (CKD) and “semi-knocked down” (SKD) kits. The measures in question originated during a time when India employed extensive import licensing requirements, ostensibly for balance of payments purposes. India’s broad licensing regime was challenged in 1997 by the European Communities and the United States, resulting in a settlement with the European Communities and a ruling in favor of the United States pursuant to which India agreed to abolish its import licensing system. Some restrictions in the automotive sector remained, however,which became the subject of this proceeding.