Officials promoted the car’s presence on city streets. However, its costs in deaths and injuries could not long be denied. Chapter 5 examines official attempts to solve the problem of the car’s violence. At first, they tried palliatives, such as the world’s first free ambulance and emergency medical services, founded in 1907. But with the posited causes of automotive accidents multiplying, legislators began to pass automotive laws and cities reformed and enlarged their traffic police forces. We examine the particulars of the law, two major phases of codification in 1941 and 1966, motorist resistance and impunity, and the impotence of police, working men on foot patrolling wealthy men in large machines. Penalties for dangerous automotive behavior, such as speeding, declined in severity over time to become almost meaningless in some decades. The city also underinvested in traffic engineering, signalization, driver education. We conclude that much that was implemented served not to solve the problem of the car but rather to consistently appease the city’s residents by promising that a solution was close at hand. City officials promised first-world automotive mortality rates but were unable to concede that such rates, while reportedly lower than Rio’s, were still catastrophic.