Hume recognizes various forms of what might be called self-love. In contrast to some of his contemporaries, who saw philosophical egoism as an encroaching modern danger, he foregrounds the perennial nature of such theories. Most, he argues, are practically inert: they cannot erase the human capacity for genuine concern for the well-being of others. But he recognizes the possibility of more malignant egoisms. I argue that the rhetorically powerful writings of La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville could represent the more dangerous forms – not because they are capable of uprooting other-regarding concerns, but because they undermine the pride that Hume thinks supports virtuous action. The “selfish system” of Epicurus, in contrast, portrays humans as capable of deep friendship and self-sacrificial love. Humean pride is not the same as self-love, which is a general care for and pursuit of one’s private interest. Both can be distinguished from vanity – a positive feeling about oneself that specifically originates from or requires the support of others’ good opinions. But for Hume, pride, self-love, and vanity can mutually support one another, in turn supporting our love of others.