An analysis of Hume’s use of the term “philosophy” in the Essays shows that he maintains a broad conception of philosophy and its use, remarkably continuous with his attitude toward philosophy in earlier works. He acknowledges that philosophy has its dangers: it can be too ambitious in its promises to free humans from the human condition; it can subvert allegiance to the state or encourage risky innovation; and it can exacerbate factionalism. But philosophy can also be a search for wisdom and personal improvement that can produce moderate but reliable effects on those with a certain temperament. Hume credits philosophy with a unique power to oppose the vices of false religion, particularly in its superstitious form. Properly chastened philosophy, moreover, can be of service to wise politicians. We can understand all of the more useful forms of philosophy as regarding one’s world and the people who inhabit it from a certain reflective distance. This distance can promote the kind of tranquility sought by the ancient Hellenistic philosophers. Ultimately, Hume’s portrayal of philosophy in the Essays suggests that mitigated hope is the proper mood for the mitigated sceptic.