This chapter test implications of our theory regarding the allocation of non-policy benefits. Partisan activists persuade voters and deliver targeted benefits providing parties with crucial resources to target individual voters with distinct policy and non-policy offers. The deployment of activists is heavily influenced by prior legacies of recruitment and specialization, since party organizations—and social relationships—take time to build and time to change. Partisan networks operate differently in Argentina than in Chile, with the former specializing on territorial activists and the latter on ideological ones. Here we focus on the conditional effect of partisan networks on both distributive expectations and ideological preferences and how these effects influence the electoral behavior of poorer and richer voters in the two countries we study. Extending the models from chapter 6, we measure the electoral benefits of expectations about targeted distribution and ideological distance conditional on network proximity, distinguishing the effects for poorer and richer voters. Our results also contribute to core-swing debate in the literature on clientelism showing that parties target distribution at core voters when they have informative partisan networks and otherwise seek to deliver to swing voters.