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8 - Targeting Patronage in Argentina and Chile

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2019

Ernesto Calvo
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park
Maria Victoria Murillo
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York
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Summary

In this chapter, we focus on public-sector wages to measure whether wage premiums conform to the varied sensitivities of voters of different socioeconomic groups in each country. In chapter 6, we show that distributive expectations about patronage have larger electoral effects in Argentina than in Chile and that electoral sensitivity toward public jobs is higher among poorer voters in Argentina and among middle-class voters in Chile. Therefore, we expect policymakers to use public-sector employment to reward the most sensitive voters in each country. Using household income data, we analyze wage differentials between public- and private-sector jobs to identify wage premiums paid by public revenue and how are these targeted. Indeed, Argentine lower-income and lower-skilled public-sector employees receive wage premiums that are significantly larger than those received by moderate-to-high-skilled/income workers. By contrast, in Chile, medium- and high-skilled public-sector employees receive larger premium wages than those of lower-skilled workers. Moreover, when we run our analysis separating by income (and controlling for education), we also find that wage premiums are targeted to lower-income workers in Argentina but not in Chile.
Type
Chapter
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Non-Policy Politics
Richer Voters, Poorer Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies
, pp. 160 - 179
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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