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45 - Noncognitivism: From the Vienna Circle to the Present Day

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2017

By
John Eriksson
Edited by
Sacha Golob  and
Jens Timmermann
Sacha Golob
Affiliation:
King's College London
Jens Timmermann
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews, Scotland
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The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy , pp. 591 - 606
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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