The wide gap between the “1 per cent” and the rest is posed in chapter 9 as a direct consequence of 1980s free money markets. This was seen in earlier eras such as Veblen’s day, yet has changed character. Social impacts of the current rise in mobile capital closely resemble the significantly unequal era of the 1900s-1930s, albeit now slightly democratic. After their responsibility for the GFC, financial sectors profited further amid chronic recession and stagnation. Data emphasizes the 1970s (again) as the turning point (juncture?) in the sector’s disdain for investment, to financial asset deals as more profitable. Disruptive and reactive competition were enhanced with authorities’ Quantitative Easing; their failure to control asset bubbles (say with reserve requirements). The 1970s search for ‘stable prices’ – money’s value as ‘objective’ – was always fictitious (Veblen). It was power relations that changed. In freeing finance from repression, workers had to be oppressed, and social democracy and the mixed economy removed; results are neither efficient nor socially useful. Distress and disaffection are inchoate and directed in negative and positive directions, given the convenient reverse logic dominating absentee holders of liquidity (saleable assets) over riven and torn political, social and economic relations