There is a series of questions that emerges from the evidence that has been scrutinised thus far in this study regarding the structural and tactical changes in the Byzantine army of the tenth century. I believe that the answers to these questions would provide us with a clear picture as to whether the Byzantines were, indeed, showing any signs of innovation or tactical adaptation to the strategic situation in the East. Most importantly, however, I wish to track down the catalyst (a battle, an encounter with an enemy nation, etc.) that provided the Byzantines with the impetus to develop many of their tactics in the operational theatres of the East. It is my intention to combine this with the following chapter that will investigate the evidence of adaptation that can be found in the contemporary historical sources about the battles between the Byzantines and the Arabs in the East for the same period – the middle of the tenth century.

Tactical Changes in the Infantry

The questions that have emerged thus far are the following: Why did Nicephorus Phocas change the infantry formation to a διττό (two-fold, double) hollow square, and why did he move the cavalry inside it? Was the double-faced formation of the infantry taxiarchy an answer to the battle tactics applied by his enemies? Why did the c. 930 Sylloge Taktikorum refer to the infantry taxiarchy as an αντίστομος (antistomos) formation – an oblong formation elongated on the front and back – rather than an αμφίστομος (amfistomos) – an oblong formation elongated on the sides, as identified by Phocas a generation later? Is there any correlation between this double-faced formation and the moving of the archers from behind the main infantry force, as described in the c. 600 Strategikon and the c. 900 Taktika, to the middle of the formation as advised by the authors of the mid-tenth century?

We have already seen the advantages offered to a mixed army marching into battle in a square formation: the enemy cannot attack the formation from all sides without dividing his forces, it is a place of refuge, and it offered far fewer opportunities for a soldier contemplating retreat or desertion.