The Byzantines encountered many different nations on the battlefield during their long history. The surveys of foreign peoples in the military treatises amply illustrate their readiness not only to scrutinise and evaluate the tactics and characteristics of their enemies, but also to learn from them when necessary and adapt their tactics to the requirements of each operational theatre. This, of course, added to the long tradition of military science inherited from classical antiquity. The Byzantines may have revered the deep knowledge of the Greeks and the Romans in military matters, but the manuals compiled in the sixth and tenth centuries AD were a conscious adaptation to the geopolitical realities of their day, with the authors willing to enrich the content of their work rather than simply pass on obsolete battle tactics. Indeed, through these manuals, the Byzantines learned to understand war and its basic principles, such as order, discipline and the creation of an adequate command structure – an invaluable lesson for every civilisation.

In the middle of the tenth century, this renewal of military science came largely as a response to the increasing danger from the Arabs, whom the Byzantines had come to consider their most formidable enemy in the East. Although none of these changes appeared overnight, by the time Emperor Nicephorus Phocas launched his ambitious campaigns in Cilicia and northern Syria in the 960s, these changes had matured and the empire was ready to reap the rewards of their fruition.

The main objective of this chapter is to point out the perception of the ‘other’ in Byzantine sources, where ‘other’ refers to the ‘military other’, and the competence and skills of the empire’s enemies as warriors. More specifically, I will focus on the following set of questions: What kinds of questions were the Byzantines asking about their enemies?