As we have seen, Kant argues that we must judge according to the principle of purposiveness without a purpose in order to characterize the dynamic unity of the diverse that characterizes organisms, but that this principle is merely subjectively necessary: it is needed to aid us in discovering laws governing these objects, but it cannot be determinatively applied to them. In the CAJ, Kant's conclusions appear similar: aesthetic judgments have only subjective universal validity, or make claims only to subjective necessity. Beauty – like organic purposiveness – is not a property of objects, but is (as it were) in the eye of the beholder. Yet Kant's question here is somewhat different than that in the CTJ: he is not concerned here to find a principle by which we could explain material unity in objects (though he does hold that beautiful objects are “formally” or “in their representation” unified) but instead to explain how something that is subjective (pleasure) could be the basis of universal or necessary claims. Thus here Kant argues not for mere subjective necessity, but for necessity in the realm of the subject. As I shall argue, Kant's account in the CAJ is nonetheless closely connected to the CTJ, for the aesthetically judging subject must itself be understood as purposive without a purpose, to be engaged in a judging activity structured by this principle.