MINIMAL ASSENT

Let us begin by distinguishing a strong from a weak sense in which belief is subject to the will. If A believes that p while knowing or believing that p is not evidentially warranted, then we shall say that A's belief involves an act of the will in the strong sense. One explanation for a belief in such circumstances might be that A wanted to believe that p and this want might, in turn, have one of a variety of explanations. For instance, believing that p makes him happy. Another explanation may be that A finds himself with a belief for which there could be no empirical evidence, for example, a metaphysical belief. Alternatively, A might find the evidence for p or not-p evenly balanced, and take the view that believing that p is permissible.

I will concentrate almost exclusively on beliefs about matters of fact, as opposed to moral or metaphysical beliefs, without forgetting that these classes of belief cannot always be clearly separated.

‘Weak’ belief, or minimal assent as I shall call it, covers a spectrum of cases. Suppose that A, a properly functioning person, comes to possess certain non-propositional evidence resulting in certain beliefs. For example, the presence of bright blue sky and bright light causes in A the belief that the sun is shining. What is minimal assent here? Simply whatever is involved in the recognition of the state of affairs described, involving sensory and conceptual application, and the intention to look. (If the evidence is regarded as propositional in character then minimal assent is the appropriate proposition functioning as a reason for immediately believing that the sun is shining.