Fideism has, in general, received a bad philosophical press. It has become a synonym for un-reason and dogmatism, and classic fideistic thinkers, such as Pascal and Kierkegaard, have been given an unsympathetic treatment. In this final chapter I wish to bring together epistemology and religion by reflecting upon fideism in the light of our development of the idea of a belief-policy

WHAT IS FIDEISM?

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines ‘fideism’ as ‘A mode of thought in which knowledge is based on a fundamental act of faith', while in his article on fideism in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Richard Popkin defines it as the claim that ‘truth in religion is ultimately based on faith rather than on reasoning or evidence’ (Popkin, 1967, pp. 201–2). From these definitions it is clear that, according to the fideist, faith provides knowledge. Such knowledge, either knowledge in general or within some particular area of inquiry, is not acquired through the reason or the senses, or by some combination of the two, but by trust, usually by trust in God. It is as a result of that trust that data become available which are otherwise not available, data which remain hidden from those not willing or able to exercise faith, but which are commonly available to all who do.

An alternative view is that a fideist is someone who holds that one may justifiably form a belief supported by insufficient evidence for the truth of what is believed or even unsupported by evidence, or even in the teeth of evidence against; or that one may justifiably give a greater degree of strength to a belief than is warranted by the evidence for the proposition that is believed.