Popular thinking about nuclear weaponry is bounded by two extreme views of technology. One is the fatalistic view that ‘the bomb’ was an inevitable development, about which nothing much could or can be done. The other is that nuclear weapons are simply tools which we build to achieve a certain end, such as deterring a potential enemy. These two extreme positions, which we can call ‘technology-out-of-control’ and ‘politics-in-command’, enclose a spectrum of theoretical possibilities. Within these extremes it is possible to identify three basic models with which we could characterize the nature of developments in weapons technology.

At the technology-out-of-control end of the spectrum there are many authors who argue that there is a ‘technological imperative’ which drives the arms race. This is a specific case of the more general theory of technological determinism, according to which technological change possesses a dynamic of its own and causes social change.

The politics-in-command viewpoint, on the other hand, sees developments in weapons technology as the product of political decision-making, and is typically characterized as based on a rational assessment of national security ‘requirements’ in relation to other states. This ‘rational actor’ model coincides to some extent with another strand of thinking in international relations theory, that of ‘realism’. In this it is the competition of states within an anarchic international system which is seen as the main determinant.

Finally, there is a third approach which views developments in weapons technology as the product of the internal social structure of the state.