When he turns to the passion of hatred, Aquinas departs from his usual scheme of treating the essence of the passion first, followed by a consideration of causes and effects. Instead, he begins with the cause of hatred (§6.1), and proceeds to ask what kinds of things qualify as the objects of hatred (§6.2). After examining hatred, Aquinas moves to the passion of “desire or concupiscence.” The treatment of this passion seems abbreviated, since Aquinas chooses to devote only one Question to it – and no Question at all to the passion he had earlier identified as its direct contrary, aversion. Despite its abbreviated character, the treatment of concupiscence is pivotal. After showing why concupiscence does not name the motion of the concupiscible power in general, but picks out a particular passion (§6.3), Aquinas proceeds to illuminate an important distinction between one type of concupiscence that all beings with sensation have, and another type that, while a passion in the proper sense and not a pseudopassion (see §2.2), is possible only for beings with intellect. This Aquinas calls “rational” or “non-natural” concupiscence (§6.4).