The evolution of competition policy outlined so far has indicated that the general regulation of monopoly became a part of British law in the teeth of general business opposition and the initial Act of 1948 was due in no small part to external pressure. Nor did any identifiable business group actively campaign for the 1956 Act, although it has been shown that the Act favoured sections of business against others, and businessmen lobbied against the administrative tribunal and for a judicial review of their practices. It would be false, however, to leave the impression that British antitrust policy evolved without successful pressure by sections of business for regulation. The development of resale price maintenance (RPM) legislation indicates that home-grown demands for regulation existed and that, in the relative absence of overseas influence, the pace and form of competition policy was primarily determined by the changing business strategies of large concerns in manufacturing and retailing.

The most detailed account of the history of policy on RPM, from the report on Fixed Retail Prices by the Standing Committee on Trusts in 1920 to the 1964 Resale Prices Act has been provided by Basil Yamey. His useful account nevertheless falls into the same trap as the histories of competition policy in general, and views the evolution of legislation as the response to public opinion and changes in moods and attitudes. He does, however, accept that the public mood will fluctuate, for instance being more aroused against RPM in times of inflation and when governments are pursuing prices and incomes policies.