This book explores the limitation of constitutional rights. In matters of rights, constitutions proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement on grand formulations that abstract away from the controversies of specific rights-claims. Yet, until they undergo a process of limitation, constitutional rights lack justification and sense as claims. The limitation clauses of most domestic and international charters of rights make explicit the process of limitation necessary for translating underdeterminate constitutional rights into determinate rights suitable for application. The argument defended in this book is that the limitation of constitutional rights remains open to re-negotiating by the legislature. It is argued that constitutions for the most part leave the difficult, contested and contingent process of limitation unresolved within the constitution itself and instead, through a limitation clause, authorize the legislature to complete the limitation of constitutional rights. In this way, the constitution, and especially the limitation of constitutional rights, is conceived of as an activity. Because the limitation of constitutional rights is provided by legislation, re-negotiating is always available and may proceed through regular democratic channels. In this way, the constitution, far from being abstracted from democratic activity, is forever negotiable by that very activity.

I am grateful to many people who have contributed, in various ways, to the development of this book. Some of the chapters are revised from my doctoral dissertation, others are new. But the general orientation of the argument was developed during my time at the University of Oxford.