The Ottoman empire's leaders understood that Russia's collapse presented a historic window of opportunity to redraw the map of the Caucasus. They were convinced, however, that soon enough Russia would recover and reemerge as the dominant power in the region and shut that window. Ottoman diplomacy at Brest-Litovsk and Batumi had midwifed four new states that put space between the Ottoman empire and Russia, but with Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus under partial Bolshevik occupation, the achievement was fragile. If the diplomatic triumph were to endure, military intervention to expel the Bolsheviks was required. Adding to the sense of urgency were the expectation that a comprehensive peace settlement was imminent and the realization that the Germans and British were also rushing to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of tsarist power in the Caucasus. Thus, in the summer of 1918 the Ottomans endeavored to sweep the Caucasus of Bolshevik influence, put the fledgling republics of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus on their feet, and block the Germans and British from penetrating further along their eastern marches. Far from being the irresponsible act of ethnic irredentism it has often been portrayed as, the Ottoman offensive into the Caucasus in 1918 was a calculated gamble to seize a critical moment to alter the region's geopolitics.

With the empire's Caucasian borders settled by the peace treaties with the three Transcaucasian republics (although technically the borders would not be fixed until the accession of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi in August), the next objective of the Ottoman army was Baku, the prize of the Caucasus.