Following Brest-Litovsk a rapidly evolving diplomatic environment continued to demand that Ottoman statecraft remain flexible and creative. The goals of building a bulwark against the resurgence of Russian power and recovering Elviye-i Selâse would guide Ottoman policy toward the Caucasus, but unlike at Brest-Litovsk, where the Ottomans were junior partners without leverage over either their enemy or their allies, in the Caucasus the Ottoman state enjoyed comparative advantages in strength and stability. For the moment, the Ottoman state was the most powerful entity in the region. The Ottomans' interlocutors in the Transcaucasus, by contrast, were isolated, confused about what they represented, and uncertain about who they were. Transcaucasia's political elites came from the same currents of democratic socialism as those who lost Russia to the Bolsheviks, and they would display many of the same flaws of naiveté, arrogance, and irresolution. Fate dealt them a weak hand of cards, and they would play that hand badly. The Transcaucasians aspired to remain part of a democratic Russia, but geopolitical pressure would force them to be free, splitting them into three separate and independent republics – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Each of these republics was born in the shape of a nation-state, and each would fit that shape poorly.