Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Apology of Socratic studies
- 2 Motivational intellectualism
- 3 The “prudential paradox”
- 4 Wrongdoing and damage to the soul
- 5 Educating the appetites and passions
- 6 Virtue intellectualism
- 7 Socrates and his ancient intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics
- Appendix: is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?
- Bibliography
- Index of passages
- General index
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Apology of Socratic studies
- 2 Motivational intellectualism
- 3 The “prudential paradox”
- 4 Wrongdoing and damage to the soul
- 5 Educating the appetites and passions
- 6 Virtue intellectualism
- 7 Socrates and his ancient intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics
- Appendix: is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?
- Bibliography
- Index of passages
- General index
Summary
SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM
The term “Socratic intellectualism” has come commonly to be used to describe either of two somewhat related features of Socratic philosophy, which may be called “virtue intellectualism” and “motivational intellectualism.” Socrates is generally, though perhaps not universally, regarded as a virtue intellectualist because he believed that all virtue is in some sense constituted by a certain kind of knowledge. In this respect, Socrates differs from Plato and Aristotle, who recognized aspects to virtue that were non-cognitive, such as having one's appetites or passions in the proper order. Socrates is generally, though, again, perhaps not universally, regarded as a motivational intellectualist because he believed that all human actions are in some way directly or immediately the result of what those acting think is best for them. Socrates' moral psychology is “intellectualist” because he is committed to the view that every ethical failure involves some cognitive failure, for each ethical failure is the direct product of some false belief about what is good for the agent of the failure.
In most of this book we use “Socratic intellectualism” to refer to motivational intellectualism. Although we take up virtue intellectualism in the penultimate chapter, our primary goal is to articulate and defend a more or less new conception of Socratic motivational intellectualism. We can only say that it is “more or less new” because we are not the first to present an alternative to what had been the received view.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Socratic Moral Psychology , pp. 1 - 10Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010