INTRODUCTION

The prudential and moral paradoxes

Of the many paradoxical positions attributed to Socrates in Plato's early dialogues, two are perhaps most closely associated with the philosopher. The first is the “prudential paradox,” which states that no one ever acts contrary to his knowledge of what is best for him or even contrary to a concurrently held all-things-considered belief about what is best for him, and the second is the “moral paradox,” according to which no one voluntarily does what is unjust. Seeing why Socrates would have held these positions in spite of their obvious conflict with common sense will allow us to understand better a number of issues at the heart of the ethical epistemology and psychology we find in Plato's early dialogues and to deepen our understanding of that philosophy. Because the moral paradox depends crucially on the prudential, we shall focus in this chapter on the prudential paradox, and will turn to the moral paradox in the next chapter.

The prudential paradox

The best-known attribution of the prudential paradox to Socrates outside the pages of Plato can be found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: