If there is such a thing as the hermeneutic circle, it is surely at least a circle. In this usage, however, “circle” is a mere metaphor. What is a circle in the sense required by the idea of a hermeneutic circle? The purpose of this comment is to develop a typology for circles in the relevant sense, and thereby show how the idea of a hermeneutic might be shown to be intelligible and what the requirements would be for there to be such a thing. I also address the issue of the need for a hermeneutic circle at all, of any kind, albeit briefly, at the end of the comment.

The hermeneutic circle must have something to do with a characteristic of the relationship between the items that are joined by the circle. So there must be (1) the items so related, and (2) the relations between them. By all accounts, the hermeneutic circle says something about explanation or understanding. So the relation of (2) must be the relation of explaining.

Is the relation in which we are interested really the explaining relation? There is an awful lot of talk in Chrys Mantzavinos's chapter, and in the literature he cites, about understanding. I know of no plausible distinction between understanding and explanation, in advance of a thesis about the irreducible differences between knowledge in, or the methodology of, the natural and social sciences. We cannot start by assuming that understanding and explanation are different ideas.