Every discipline is defined by the problems that it deals with; and since the nature, complexity, and breadth of problems are not settled once and for all but change over time, so do the disciplinary boundaries. Philosophy of the social sciences as a discipline is also changing over time, according to the problems it deals with and the solutions it works out. Despite the constant change of the discipline amidst constant debates on a variety of topics, there are some problem areas that possess a certain prominence and somehow define the field: I mean the problem areas that any interested person approaching the field for the first time legitimately expects to see addressed. These are roughly three: the class of problems dealing with sociality (or to put it very broadly, with social ontology); the problem area of the methodology of the social sciences; and lastly the issues dealing with the interaction between philosophy and the social sciences.

This volume was designed to address these three problem areas in its three respective parts. The basic tenet of the book is that the discipline of the philosophy of the social sciences can only produce fruitful results if it takes the findings and the practices of the social scientists into account. In a sense, the volume takes a middle ground position between two extremes.