INTRODUCTION

The breakdown of communist regimes in Eastern Europe has resulted in the emergence of constitutional courts throughout the region. The introduction of constitutional courts rested on a belief that judiciary is the least dangerous branch of government and on profound distrust in politicians. Such ideas emanated from previous experiences of authoritarian governance and a lack of democratic heritage. The constitution was viewed as a legal act designed to keep politics within boundaries of law, whereas the ideal guardian of constitution was found in an independent judicial authority. In most cases, establishing Kelsenian judicial review created activist courts, which derived legitimacy from their role in democratic transition and from the new democratic constitutional structure. Although this type of strong and centralized judicial review of legislation existed in transitional Serbia as well, there were obvious specificities of both democratic transition and constitutional adjudication that make Serbia a case worthy of detailed exploration.

In contrast to the omnipresent Eastern European narrative, democratic transition in Serbia did not commence immediately after the fall of communism. The transition was not pervasive, but incremental, all while burdened by a multitude of problems. The first postcommunist constitution introduced a multiparty system in 1990; nevertheless, it did not lead to establishment of democracy. Instead, it took a decade of wars and authoritarian rule before democratic revolution ensued in 2000. This did not conclude the problems created by the heritage of dictatorship, as Serbia was only beginning to face new challenges: assassination of the prime minister, a state of emergency, dissolution of federation with Montenegro and secession of Kosovo.