Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 The megaprojects paradox
- 2 A calamitous history of cost overrun
- 3 The demand for megaprojects
- 4 Substance and spin in megaproject economics
- 5 Environmental impacts and risks
- 6 Regional and economic growth effects
- 7 Dealing with risk
- 8 Conventional megaproject development
- 9 Lessons of privatisation
- 10 Four instruments of accountability
- 11 Accountable megaproject decision making
- 12 Beyond the megaprojects paradox
- Appendix. Risk and accountability at work: a case study
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - A calamitous history of cost overrun
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 The megaprojects paradox
- 2 A calamitous history of cost overrun
- 3 The demand for megaprojects
- 4 Substance and spin in megaproject economics
- 5 Environmental impacts and risks
- 6 Regional and economic growth effects
- 7 Dealing with risk
- 8 Conventional megaproject development
- 9 Lessons of privatisation
- 10 Four instruments of accountability
- 11 Accountable megaproject decision making
- 12 Beyond the megaprojects paradox
- Appendix. Risk and accountability at work: a case study
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this and the following chapters we review the experience from a large number of megaprojects, including the Channel tunnel and the links across Great Belt and Øresund, all three multibillion-dollar projects. Although we subject these projects to critical scrutiny, our objective is not to criticise them, even where they have underperformed, but to learn constructively from experience by identifying lessons that may prove useful in improving future decisions regarding megaprojects. Given the large amounts of money spent on major transport infrastructure projects, it is remarkable how little data and research are available that would help answer the two basic questions: (i) whether such projects have the intended effects; and (ii) how the actual viability of such projects compares to projected viability. Therefore, in addition to transport projects, we have found it pertinent to review data and research from other types of infrastructure project and to compare experience from these projects with experience from the transport sector. In this manner, we will review data from several hundred large projects. In this chapter we focus on the costs of megaprojects. In Chapters 3 and 4 we consider the demand for, and viability of, such project.
A first step in reducing cost overrun is to acknowledge that a substantial risk for overrun exists and cannot be completely eliminated; but it can be moderated.
The problem of cost overrun
Cost overruns in major transport infrastructure projects are widespread.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Megaprojects and RiskAn Anatomy of Ambition, pp. 11 - 21Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003