Rawls’s theory of justice is individualistic in one sense, but, according to him, not in another. The sense in which it is individualistic can be gleaned from the passage in which Rawls writes that although “it is customary to think of utilitarianism as individualistic . . utilitarianism is not individualistic” because it does not “take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals” (TJ 29). The principle of utility directs us to evaluate a government policy by considering only whether it would result in the greatest aggregate sum of utility. Parties in the original position would therefore choose the principle of utility to govern their society only if they assume that a big loss to one person is compensated for by small gains to many people. But to assume this, Rawls argues, is to apply the principle of rational choice for one person to all of society, which fails to take seriously the separateness of persons. Parties in the original position, according to Rawls, do not assume this. Rather they rank systems of principles by considering whether the best possible outcome for them under a system (for example, the outcome of being super rich) is good enough to justify accepting the worst possible outcome under this system (for example, the outcome of being terribly poor), or whether they should choose another system which has a less desirable best possible outcome (being well off but not super rich) but also a more desirable worst possible outcome (having relatively modest means but not being poor).