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9 - The Duty of Fair Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2013

William B. Gould IV
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
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Summary

The duty of fair representation, under which a union as exclusive bargaining agent has an obligation to deal fairly on behalf of all of a bargaining unit’s employees (union and nonunion), has been inferred from the NLRA’s grant of authority to the union to negotiate on behalf of all workers. That other nations do not have the exclusivity concept and all its consequences makes this kind of litigation peculiar to the United States.

In 1944 the Supreme Court held that the failure of a union to meet its duty of fair representation constituted a violation of federal labor law, and the NLRB subsequently held that it constituted an unfair labor practice as well.

The duty of fair representation is ... akin to the duty owed by other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries ... some Members of the Court have analogized the duty a union owes to the employees it represents to the duty a trustee owes to trust beneficiaries others have likened the relationship between union and employee to that between attorney and client ... the fair representation duty also parallels the responsibilities of corporate officers and directors towards shareholders. Just as these fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a duty of care as well as a duty of loyalty, a union owes employees a duty to represent them adequately as well as honestly and in good faith.

In Vaca v. Sipes the Court held that the federal courts as well as the Board had jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation cases. However, unless the collective bargaining agreement authorizes the individual to take his or her grievance to arbitration, the union maintains control of the grievance and may determine whether to initiate arbitration. The Court held that the individual employee has no “absolute right” to initiate arbitration and that the industrial self-government that had been created by the parties would be harmed by a contrary rule. At the same time the Court concluded that an employee could attack the union’s failure to process the grievance if its actions toward an employee in the bargaining unit were “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” It is difficult to determine what the Court meant by these words. Whether a union’s simple failure to process a grievance because it was lost or forgotten constitutes a failure to meet the duty of fair representation is unresolved,but it certainly presents a difficulty for the employee whose grievance is meritorious.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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References

Cox, A., “Rights under a Labor Agreement,” 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956)Google Scholar
Hanslowe, K., “Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations,” 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959)Google Scholar
Summers, C., “The Individual Employee’s Rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251 (1977)Google Scholar
Gould, W., “Solidarity Forever – Or Hardly Ever,” 66 Cornell L. Rev. 77 (1980)Google Scholar
Cox, A., “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819 (1960)Google Scholar
Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth, “Union Security Agreements under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court Opinion in Beck,” 27 Harv. J. on Legis. 51 (1990)Google Scholar
Topol, Union Shops, State Action and the National Labor Relations Act,” 101 Yale L.J. 1135 (1992)

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