This book has a primary focus. It is to document the history, with all its successes and failures, of the US Navy's efforts to achieve the “100 knot Navy”. It includes the critical decade 1969–1979 when the Navy spent more than $650 million (and closer to $1 billion if all related technologies are included) to develop a 3,000 ton displacement (frigate size) ship capable of conducting navy missions at 100 knots. The Navy program was canceled on 9 January 1980 after failed technological development and the Navy turned its attention to ships with much lower speeds.

This book also has a second major focus which is to examine the various hydrodynamic and aerodynamic theories and substantiated data of various forms of marine craft designed for high speed other than just “100 knots”. This fall-out from that intensive effort produced a wealth of data and information on innovative forms of high speed marine craft. This has been an important byproduct that is included and expanded upon in the various chapters of this book.

The average speed of naval fleets using conventional displacement ships is about 25 knots. The goal to quadruple that speed to 100 knots proved to be a “bridge too far”. Immediately following the cancelation in 1980 of those intensive efforts, the Navy re-directed its attention to advanced design ships with speeds closer to 50 knots – a mere doubling of the current fleet speeds! But even that “goal” has not yet gained a foothold for either commercial or naval fleets in any sustainable manner. The Navy, after some sketchy and limited beginnings in 1965, initially in consort with the US Maritime Administration, had concluded that the best way of achieving a “100 knot Navy” was to select one form of non-amphibious air cushion craft out of several other advanced marine vehicle concepts available at that time to achieve such a capability.