Patrol contacts occurred when a 1ATF patrol encountered a VC/PAVN patrol and a firefight took place. The enemy patrol could be moving, temporarily halted or waiting in ambush. Enemy ambushes of 1ATF patrols were rare; in nearly six years of combat operations resulting in almost four thousand contacts, there were only 103 such ambushes. Except for these few enemy ambushes, patrol contacts are generally characterised by neither side having selected and prepared the ground. In the other three main types of contact – ambushes of the enemy, bunker system attacks and security contacts (each discussed in the following chapters) – one side or other has selected and prepared the ground in advance of the contact. A tactical advantage has been derived from doing so, and this advantage can be quantified. But we begin in this chapter with an examination of those contacts in which, except for a small number of enemy ambushes, neither side selected and prepared the ground. The resulting combat is free from the influence of any tactical advantage derived from doing so.

Relatively uninfluenced by prior selection and preparation of the ground, patrol contacts tended to unfold in accordance with a number of factors unrelated to the ground such as the relative strengths of the forces involved, the range of engagement, individual shooting skills, field-craft, tactical doctrine and the ability to bring these elements together effectively. This last factor encompasses such intangible issues as morale, aggression, battlefield discipline and leadership. It is difficult to quantify these intangibles; however, it should be noted that the analysis we present in the next four chapters incorporates the effects of these intangibles in the results we derive.

SIZE OF ENEMY FORCES

One of the first factors to impose itself on a patrol contact was the size of the enemy force encountered. In their combat after-action reports (CAAR), 1ATF patrol commanders nearly always gave an estimate of the strength of the enemy in contact. However, as we showed in chapter 3, contacts, whether patrol contacts, ambushes, bunker system attacks or security contacts, were the fights the enemy did not want. Unless he sensed that he held a tactical advantage, his first response to a patrol contact was usually to disengage as quickly as possible and escape into the jungle. This tendency is reflected in the duration of contacts. In patrol contacts, 57 per cent lasted five minutes or less.