This study has analysed the tactical performance of 1ATF in the Vietnam War. It has shown how the Task Force dominated enemy forces in the low-intensity struggle. This was achieved not by the application of massive firepower but through superior tactical techniques, which gave Task Force units the tactical initiative and the opportunity to be the first to open fire. To an extent not matched in other forms of warfare, the smallest details matter in counter-insurgency. Training in the simplest, most detailed skills – bushcraft, silent movement, snap shooting, security at the halt and on the move, navigation and a host of other factors – gave 1ATF patrols the opportunity to fire first in the great majority of contacts. This conferred a significant advantage on Task Force patrols. The results confirmed the truth of the old Army aphorism ‘Sweat saves blood’. Training effort is repaid on the battlefield by improved combat effectiveness and reduced casualties. 1ATF's tactical dominance was strongest in patrol encounters and ambushes of the enemy. Together, these two combat types constituted more than 70 per cent of Task Force contacts with the enemy. Those combat types in which Task Force dominance was marginal or non-existent – such as bunker system attacks, enemy ambushes of Task Force patrols, and mine incidents – represented a small percentage of total contacts. The enemy was unable to conduct operations such that these latter combat types constituted a greater percentage of total contacts, or, to put it another way, they were unable to shift the combat onto those types least favourable to 1ATF. They lost the ability to control their casualties. This was despite the enemy's advantages including superior local knowledge, twenty years of combat experience and, arguably, a better suite of small arms. The Task Force tactical dominance in low-intensity warfare was indicated by loss ratios that heavily favoured 1ATF.