Necessity has been called the mother of invention. In philosophy, however, the notion of necessity is viewed in a different and somewhat more controversial light. In certain philosophical circles necessity is viewed as the root of much, if not all, philosophical error. In the latter half of the twentieth century, W. V. Quine, one of America's most influential philosophers, claimed that the logic of necessity, now referred to as modal logic, was conceived in sin: the (logical) sin of confusing use with mention. In this philosophical environment, Saul Kripke published his earliest work on modal logic. Kripke's work in modal logic was to have a major influence on the development of modal logic and philosophy in the future. It also was the foundation of many of Kripke's later philosophical contributions. To understand Kripke's early work, it will be helpful to begin by briefly reviewing developments in logic through the twentieth century.

As a number of commentators have noted, philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century took a decidedly linguistic turn, which led, among other things, to a greater interest in logic. The first comprehensive modern system of formal logic is Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift, published in 1879. Frege's work was not widely known at the time, however, and cannot be said to have had a great influence on the early development of modern logic. One notable exception is the influence it had on Bertrand Russell's own work in the field.