One of the features of Kripke's philosophical preoccupations that can be seen in much of his work is his interest in puzzles and paradoxes. We find him commenting on the paradox of identity, the puzzle of belief, the paradox of the liar, the surprise exam paradox (unpublished) and so on. So it is perhaps not too surprising that in 1982 Kripke published in book form his commentary on Wittgenstein's famous private language argument. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition presents a skeptical paradox and a “skeptical solution” based on Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Like all of Kripke's work, it has produced a wide range of responses. It is, however, different in certain respects from his other work.

First of all, Kripke explicitly states that the arguments and positions that he presents in this book are not to be taken as his views. He says “It deserves emphasis that I do not in this piece of writing attempt to speak for myself, or, except in occasional and minor asides, to say anything about my own views on the substantive issues” (WRPL: ix). Because Kripke explicitly denies offering his own views in this essay, it would be natural to assume that his goal is to provide a correct historical account of Wittgenstein's views.