There is a timeless feel of failure and decay to the 1610s: the death of Robert Cecil, the emergence of Robert Carr as James's favourite, an addled parliament, the poisonous intrigues of the Howards, Carr's fall and the spectacular rise of George Villiers. James appears as an indolent king presiding over a regime riddled by faction, corruption and murderous intrigue. Contemporaries painted these details in vivid hues and left historians a compelling lead to follow, but the portrait is vastly overdrawn. The regime's failures and the nastiness of patronage politics are justifiably recorded, but they have skewed the perspective. We lack a corresponding portrait of the period from the standpoint of kingship and governance. There is a good reason for this. We do not possess the voluminous working papers and collections from which to depict governance with the same depth and clarity as in the first decade of James's reign. It may never be possible to produce a finished portrait of kingship and governance in the second decade, but there are discernible patterns in the work of governors on finance that are sufficient to suggest that we cannot present the 1610s only as a study in irredeemably corrupt court politics or interpret finance entirely from that perspective. This chapter will endeavour to provide a more rounded treatment, paying particular attention to James's agenda for policy and its interaction with the treasury regimes of Salisbury, Northampton and the earl of Suffolk.