As reflected in theory, laboratory evidence, and field studies,
altruistic punishment of defectors promotes cooperation. Costly
self-enforcement of socially optimal behavior has a number of independent
links in political science, economics, psychology, sociology, computer
science, and biology. This paper integrates the study of sanctions-based
provision of public goods in the social sciences with the research on
evolutionary adaptedness of altruistic punishment in the life sciences.
Altruistic punishment appears to be (1) economically rational, (2)
evolutionarily robust as an individual propensity and as a cultural norm,
(3) normatively more appealing than tit-for-tat, which is a reciprocal
punishment by defection, and (4) socially common. The theoretical and
empirical importance of altruistic punishment has immediate policy
implications. Examination of commons around the world suggests that
privatization and centralized coercion are not the only solutions to the
tragedy of the commons. A viable policy alternative is to facilitate the
evolution of the commons as a common-property regime with its own norms
and a certain degree of independence.Oleg
Smirnov is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stony Brook
University (Oleg.Smirnov@sunysb.edu). He would like to thank
Terry Anderson, Daniel Benjamin, James Fowler, Tim Johnson, John Orbell,
Tony Smith, Wally Thurman, and anonymous referees for helpful comments.
This research was supported by the Property and Environment Research
Center (PERC), Bozeman, MT.