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Use of vitamin D supplements during infancy in an international feeding trial
- Eveliina Lehtonen, Anne Ormisson, Anita Nucci, David Cuthbertson, Susa Sorkio, Mila Hyytinen, Kirsi Alahuhta, Carol Berseth, Marja Salonen, Shayne Taback, Margaret Franciscus, Teba González-Frutos, Tuuli E Korhonen, Margaret L Lawson, Dorothy J Becker, Jeffrey P Krischer, Mikael Knip, Suvi M Virtanen, , Thomas Mandrup-Poulsen, Elias Arjas, Åke Lernmark, Barbara Schmidt, Jeffrey P. Krischer, Hans K. Åkerblom, Mila Hyytinen, Mikael Knip, Katriina Koski, Matti Koski, Eeva Pajakkala, Marja Salonen, David Cuthbertson, Jeffrey P. Krischer, Linda Shanker, Brenda Bradley, Hans-Michael Dosch, John Dupré, William Fraser, Margaret Lawson, Jeffrey L. Mahon, Mathew Sermer, Shayne P. Taback, Dorothy Becker, Margaret Franciscus, Anita Nucci, Jerry Palmer, Minna Pekkala, Suvi M. Virtanen, Jacki Catteau, Neville Howard, Patricia Crock, Maria Craig, Cheril L. Clarson, Lynda Bere, David Thompson, Daniel Metzger, Colleen Marshall, Jennifer Kwan, David K. Stephure, Daniele Pacaud, Wendy Schwarz, Rose Girgis, Marilyn Thompson, Shayne P. Taback, Daniel Catte, Margaret L. Lawson, Brenda Bradley, Denis Daneman, Mathew Sermer, Mary-Jean Martin, Valérie Morin, Lyne Frenette, Suzanne Ferland, Susan Sanderson, Kathy Heath, Céline Huot, Monique Gonthier, Maryse Thibeault, Laurent Legault, Diane Laforte, Elizabeth A. Cummings, Karen Scott, Tracey Bridger, Cheryl Crummell, Robyn Houlden, Adriana Breen, George Carson, Sheila Kelly, Koravangattu Sankaran, Marie Penner, Richard A. White, Nancy King, James Popkin, Laurie Robson, Eva Al Taji, Irena Aldhoon, Pavla Mendlova, Jan Vavrinec, Jan Vosahlo, Ludmila Brazdova, Jitrenka Venhacova, Petra Venhacova, Adam Cipra, Zdenka Tomsikova, Petra Krckova, Pavla Gogelova, Ülle Einberg, Mall-Anne Riikjärv, Anne Ormisson, Vallo Tillmann, Päivi Kleemola, Anna Parkkola, Heli Suomalainen, Anna-Liisa Järvenpää, Anu-Maaria Hämälainen, Hannu Haavisto, Sirpa Tenhola, Pentti Lautala, Pia Salonen, Susanna Aspholm, Heli Siljander, Carita Holm, Samuli Ylitalo, Raisa Lounamaa, Anja Nuuja, Timo Talvitie, Kaija Lindström, Hanna Huopio, Jouni Pesola, Riitta Veijola, Päivi Tapanainen, Abram Alar, Paavo Korpela, Marja-Liisa Käär, Taina Mustila, Ritva Virransalo, Päivi Nykänen, Bärbel Aschemeier, Thomas Danne, Olga Kordonouri, Dóra Krikovszky, László Madácsy, Yeganeh Manon Khazrai, Ernesto Maddaloni, Paolo Pozzilli, Carla Mannu, Marco Songini, Carine de Beaufort, Ulrike Schierloh, Jan Bruining, Margriet Bisschoff, Aleksander Basiak, Renata Wasikowa, Marta Ciechanowska, Grazyna Deja, Przemyslawa Jarosz-Chobot, Agnieszka Szadkowska, Katarzyna Cypryk, Malgorzata Zawodniak-Szalapska, Luis Castano, Teba Gonzalez Frutos, Mirentxu Oyarzabal, Manuel Serrano-Ríos, María Teresa Martínez-Larrad, Federico Gustavo Hawkins, Dolores Rodriguez Arnau, Johnny Ludvigsson, Malgorzata Smolinska Konefal, Ragnar Hanas, Bengt Lindblad, Nils-Osten Nilsson, Hans Fors, Maria Nordwall, Agne Lindh, Hans Edenwall, Jan Aman, Calle Johansson, Margrit Gadient, Eugen Schoenle, Dorothy Becker, Ashi Daftary, Margaret Franciscus, Carol Gilmour, Jerry Palmer, Rachel Taculad, Marilyn Tanner-Blasiar, Neil White, Uday Devaskar, Heather Horowitz, Lisa Rogers, Roxana Colon, Teresa Frazer, Jose Torres, Robin Goland, Ellen Greenberg, Maudene Nelson, Holly Schachner, Barney Softness, Jorma Ilonen, Massimo Trucco, Lynn Nichol, Erkki Savilahti, Taina Härkönen, Mikael Knip, Outi Vaarala, Kristiina Luopajärvi, Hans-Michael Dosch
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- Public Health Nutrition / Volume 17 / Issue 4 / April 2014
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- 24 June 2013, pp. 810-822
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Objective
To examine the use of vitamin D supplements during infancy among the participants in an international infant feeding trial.
DesignLongitudinal study.
SettingInformation about vitamin D supplementation was collected through a validated FFQ at the age of 2 weeks and monthly between the ages of 1 month and 6 months.
SubjectsInfants (n 2159) with a biological family member affected by type 1 diabetes and with increased human leucocyte antigen-conferred susceptibility to type 1 diabetes from twelve European countries, the USA, Canada and Australia.
ResultsDaily use of vitamin D supplements was common during the first 6 months of life in Northern and Central Europe (>80 % of the infants), with somewhat lower rates observed in Southern Europe (>60 %). In Canada, vitamin D supplementation was more common among exclusively breast-fed than other infants (e.g. 71 % v. 44 % at 6 months of age). Less than 2 % of infants in the USA and Australia received any vitamin D supplementation. Higher gestational age, older maternal age and longer maternal education were study-wide associated with greater use of vitamin D supplements.
ConclusionsMost of the infants received vitamin D supplements during the first 6 months of life in the European countries, whereas in Canada only half and in the USA and Australia very few were given supplementation.
Patterns of participation in recreational and leisure activities among children with complex physical disabilities
- Mary Law, Gillian King, Susanne King, Marilyn Kertoy, Patricia Hurley, Peter Rosenbaum, Nancy Young, Steven Hanna
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- Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology / Volume 48 / Issue 5 / May 2006
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- 11 April 2006, pp. 337-342
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- May 2006
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Children with physical disabilities are at increased risk of limitations to participation in everyday activities. This study describes research examining the participation of children in day-to-day formal and informal activities (excluding mandated academic schooling). Using the Children's Assessment of Participation and Enjoyment (CAPE) measure, data on participation patterns were collected from 427 children (229 males, 198 females; mean age 10y [SD 2y 4mo]; range 6-14y) with physical limitations and from their families. The primary types of physical disability in the sample included cerebral palsy, spina bifida, acquired brain injury, and musculoskeletal limitations. Findings indicate a broad range of diversity and intensity of participation, with proportionately greater involvement in informal rather than formal activities. Significant differences in participation and enjoyment were found between males and females, and for children more than 12 years of age. Children's participation was less diverse in families reporting lower income, single-parent status, and lower respondent parent education. These findings provide a foundation for an improved understanding of the participation of children with physical disabilities, which can assist families and service providers in planning activities that fit with their child's preferences and ensure active participation.
1 - The Prison-House of Language
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Summary
Scepticism and the content of “commonsense”
We think, and we speak our thoughts. Necessarily we speak them, even to ourselves, in some language, either in a so-called natural one – French, English, Hebrew, Greek – or in one of the so-called artificial languages of mathematics or formal logic. Whatever language we choose to speak, or must speak, however, we take ourselves often enough, most often perhaps, to be speaking in it of real things: things “real” in the sense, a sense introduced to philosophy by Descartes, and the source of much enduring intellectual anguish since, of being “outside the mind.”
But are not words themselves creatures of language? Is language itself not a creation of the human mind? If so, what assurance have we that, when we speak, we speak of the furniture of the universe, of Reality itself, rather than merely of the homely, and home-made, furniture of our own minds?
In raising such doubts we envisage the possibility that language, although it may seem the house of the mind, with windows opening on an extramental, extralinguistic world, may in fact be a prison, with none. The image of language as a prison no doubt owes something, historically, to Plato's myth of the Cave. But those immured in the Prison-House of Language, as philosophers since Locke have conceived it, are rather worse off than those chained facing the back wall of Plato's Cave.
Preface
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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This book is the product of a transatlantic cross-fertilisation. The authors found themselves from 1991 onwards members of the same department, at the University of Utah, to which Harrison had moved from a British university (Sussex). At that time, Hanna was nourishing some doubts about various forms of meaning-scepticism, mainly in Quine and Kripke. Harrison had a number of projects on hand, one of which was an absurdly ambitious attempt to rethink the philosophy of language since Frege from the standpoint of an idiosyncratic reinterpretation of Wittgenstein. Some of the component parts of this enterprise, including a series of exegetical studies of middle-period Wittgenstein, had seen or were about to see print, but the project as a whole was, to put it bluntly, stalled, and had been stalled, except on its exegetical front, since the early 1980s. Conversation between us at first revealed some points of contact between our two projects. Then we began to see the possibility of certain large structural moves that would get Harrison's project moving again, in directions that would provide a framework for Hanna's ideas. At first we thought the work might yield a joint paper. Later we realised that it would have to be a series of papers. Finally we resigned ourselves to producing a joint book. By this time so many changes had occurred in each of our minds, stemming from objections or suggestions by the other, that we would have been at a loss to say which of us “owned” which parts of the project.
9 - Meaning and Truth
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Sense and truth-conditions
It has been a commonplace of philosophy since Frege that “the sense of a sentence is determined by its truth-conditions.” But that, as it stands, is a dark utterance. We need for a start to distinguish between the sentence and its sense. A sentence is just a string of words. Different sentential strings may have the same sense: “express,” as is often said, “the same proposition.” Both (some) sentences and the propositions they express may be said to be assertoric in form, in the sense that what each expresses is the content of an assertion. It is this that makes “The cat is on the mat” an altogether different sort of logical entity from a mere string of names: “James Peter John.” So one could say that both sentences and propositions aim at truth. What one means by that, roughly speaking, is that only in the case of the kinds of sentence that express the content of a possible assertion does the question of truth arise. As Frege put it, “The only thing that raises the question of truth at all is the sense of sentences.” But to raise the question of truth and falsity is not necessarily to be susceptible of truth or falsity. Even an assertoric sentence, such as “The cat is on the mat,” cannot be said to be in its own right true or false.
PART III - PROPOSITIONS
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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PART I - SCEPTICISM AND LANGUAGE
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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13 - Indeterminacy of Translation
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Introduction
Philosophy exists to trouble the peace of minds secure in their assumptions. Its shadow has always lain athwart the paths of commonsense thinking. To be fertile in paradox is part of its nature. At the same time the mind can never for long rest content with conclusions which smack of it. Paradox is not a resting-place, rather a spur to further thought. And for that reason, philosophical paradox is a serious matter, to which, when it is the product of a considerable mind, real intellectual importance can attach. It is something to be resolved, transcended if possible; it is not, by contrast, at least at its best and most serious, something to be laughed off.
In this Part, we have to deal with two such flights of paradox. The first, which will occupy us in this chapter, is Quine's celebrated argument for the indeterminacy of translation. The second is an argument of Kripke's which seems to show that our ordinary criteria for ascribing belief on the basis of sincere assent to propositions lead in certain cases to irresoluble contradiction. We shall argue that both are plausible only when their supporting arguments are advanced against the background of a certain, widely pervasive intellectual outlook, namely, the one we have been attacking throughout this book. Dispensing with Referential Realism, along the lines argued in Parts I–III, allows one, as we shall see, to deal rather swiftly with them.
8 - Knowledge of Rules
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Wittgenstein's Slogan and the later Wittgenstein
In Chapter 3, we outlined a strategy of opposition to Referential Realism. In pursuit of that strategy we committed ourselves in chapter 4 to a defence of what we there called Wittgenstein's Slogan: “Logic must take care of itself.” We took the Slogan to be equivalent to the proposal that all “logical” questions, taking “logical” in a sense broad enough to include all questions of the meaning and reference of terms, must be capable of being settled antecedently to the assignment of truth or falsity to any contingent proposition. And we began our defence by attempting to show, in Chapters 5–7, that the ability to refer by means of a proper name does not depend on a speaker's knowing any contingent truth concerning the entity to which he refers, but only on his knowing-how to participate in some selection of the array of socially instituted practices, maintained with the general object of keeping track of items by means of their names, which we called the Name-Tracking Network.
We have assumed, in short, that what is required to implement Wittgenstein's Slogan, once it is removed from its original context in the phase of Wittgenstein's thought that culminated in the Tractatus, is some way of representing what is known in knowing a language as knowledge-how, not knowledge-that: knowledge of the workings of practices, not knowledge of the truth of propositions.
5 - The Name-Tracking Network
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Nomothetic objects
Russell's Principle in Russell's version is the dictum that “Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.” In Gareth Evans's version, it is the more or less equivalent claim that it is possible for a person to have a thought about something only if he knows which particular individual in the world he is thinking about, with the rider that at some point the phrase “which individual” will have to be spelled out in terms of sensory acquaintance if the demands of the principle are to be met.
It is worth noticing right at the outset, therefore, that there are types of reference and referring expression to which neither version of the Principle appears to have any application whatsoever. Take for instance, the sentence “The King can move one square in any direction.”
“The King” is a referring expression. It picks out an object, the chess-King. It would be possible, for that matter, to envisage a chess nomenclature in which, rather than being indicated by means of definite descriptions, “The White King,” “The White Queen's Bishop,” “The White Queen's Knight's Pawn,” and so on, the objects so indicated would be baptised with proper names: “King George,” “Queen Mary,” “Kaiser Wilhelm,” “Bishop Wilberforce,” and so on.
The identity of the object picked out by the definite description “The White King,” or by an equivalent proper name, however, neither needs to be explained, nor could be explained, “by acquaintance.”
11 - Unnatural Kinds
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Universals
Does the universe contain, in addition to individuals, kinds and properties? This is the celebrated Problem of Universals. The traditional answers to it comprise Realism, which posits kinds and properties in addition to their individual exemplars and instances, and Nominalism, which allows the existence only of individuals. There is also a third answer, Conceptualism, which, recoiling both from the absurdities of an outright Nominalism and from the over-richly peopled universe of the Realist, assigns to kinds and properties the refuge of a shadowy existence as mental templates, or rules, for shuffling individuals into the sets, or as logicians say, extensions, associated with kind-names.
Realism was born with Plato. Nominalism, despite the efforts of Nelson Goodman or Hartry Field, is widely regarded as having died with Hobbes. The analytic tradition in philosophy has tended until very recently to alternate uneasily between the options of Conceptualism and some kind of platonic or quasi-platonic Realism. The Realism recommended both by Frege and by the early Russell was of this kind.
Thoughts, Frege agrees with Plato, are eternal, immutable essences which are neither created, nor sustained, nor in any way altered by any human activity; nor are they perceivable by any human sense. And so, Frege concludes, they exist neither in the external material world, nor in the subjective inner world: “a third realm must be recognized.”
“Third realms” and their contents sit ill, however, with the Positivism-derived naturalism and empiricism of so much analytic philosophy.
3 - Out of the Prison-House
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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To say that self-sufficient thought always refers to a thought enmeshed in language is not to say that thought is alienated or that language cuts thought off from truth and certainty. We must understand that language is not an impediment to consciousness …
– Maurice Merleau-PontyReference, Meaning, and Intention
The three forms of Referential Realism we have so far distinguished, albeit in a fairly brisk and sketchy way, account for a considerable part of what has taken place in analytic philosophy of language since 1900. They exhibit numerous incompatibilities, and the discussion of their relative merits has achieved considerable heights of complexity and acuity. We shall not, except occasionally and indirectly, enter into those discussions. Our object in this book is not to argue for or against any particular version of Referential Realism but to attack Referential Realism root and branch.
In opposition to the Referential Realist we shall contend that the entities “picked out by,” or “referred to,” or “designated by” all of the content-bearing expressions of a natural language are without exception linguistic constructs: things “constituted by linguistic convention,” in the sense of being things having no existence in nature prior to the constitution of language. At the same time we shall argue that such a claim yields neither of the absurd consequences it is generally supposed to yield.
4 - Russell's Principle and Wittgenstein's Slogan
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Understanding Algernon
“Bunbury,” as all lovers of Wilde are aware, is the name of a mythical friend and chronic invalid invented by Mr. Algernon Moncrieff to justify his absence from London dinner-tables during the summer months. To those not in on the secret, Algernon is unwillingly responding to the voice of conscience urging him as a sacred duty to spend time at the bedside of his sick friend. Those in on the secret are aware that he is doing nothing so improbable as his duty. He is simply off enjoying himself in the country: “going Bunburying.” There is no Bunbury.
In what sense, then, can those not in the secret be said to understand the remark “Bunbury is ill again”? Those in the unphilosophical and rather numerous majority whose bookshelves are innocent of the works of Gottlob Frege, seeing no problem, may be inclined to respond that they understand it as well as, and in the same way as, any other English sentence employing a proper name. For analytic philosophers since Frege, by contrast, the issue has been a loaded one; one that, almost more than any other, brings into focus a nest of problems concerning the question that has been occupying us: how and to what extent are the spontaneities of language constrained by reality?
10 - Truth and Use
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Negative description
In Chapter 9, we presented some intuitive objections to a very widespread and popular account of the extent and nature of the observational basis available to ground judgments of meaning. Our business in this chapter is to explain the basis of the intuitions involved, in the process clarifying their relationships to one another and revealing the reasoning underlying what was in Chapter 9 no more than an intuitively founded scepticism.
A good place to start is the following – as usual extraordinarily condensed and so superficially gnomic – string of remarks from §82 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks.
“I haven't got stomach-ache” may be compared to the proposition “These apples cost nothing.” The point is that they don't cost any money, not that they don't cost any snow or any trouble. The zero is the zero point of one scale. And since I can't be given any point on the yardstick without being given the yardstick, I can't be given its zero point either. “I haven't got a pain” doesn't refer to a condition in which there can be no talk of pain, on the contrary we're talking about pain. The proposition presupposes the capacity for feeling pain, and this can't be a “physiological capacity” – for otherwise how would we know what it was a capacity for – it's a logical possibility. – I describe my present state by alluding to something that isn't the case. If this allusion is needed for the description (and isn't merely an ornament), there must be something in my present state making it necessary to mention (allude to) this. […]
7 - Descriptions and Causes
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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The causal theory
Whether or not one is persuaded by the account of rigidity offered in the preceding chapter, some answer is clearly needed to the question how it can be possible for a speaker to refer rigidly by means of a name; that is, to refer to the same individual “across possible worlds.”
The answer that has received most attention so far is the one tentatively advanced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity in terms of what he there calls “chains of communication,” but now generally known as the Causal Theory of Names. Here is Kripke's account of the theory:
Someone, let's say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is at the far end of the chain, who has heard about, say, Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman was a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he can't identify him uniquely. He doesn't know what a Feynman diagram is, he doesn't know what the Feynman theory of pair production and annihilation is. […]
Introduction
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Philosophy, as Gilbert Ryle noted long ago, deals characteristically in dilemmas: their exploration and (sometimes) their resolution. Ryle was clearly right. Philosophical puzzlement very often originates in a question – which for some reason seems to us momentous – either answer to which commits us to unpalatable or implausible consequences.
So it is with the question whether “language” in the abstract, language taken as a semantic order, a system of meanings, “mirrors the world”: whether the categories, concepts, structures with which it furnishes us, far from being inventions of the human mind, simply transcribe categories and structures already inscribed in Nature, or Reality. If we answer “yes,” we surely discount, or at least minimise to an implausible degree, the part played by human ingenuity in the constitution of meaning in actual languages. If we answer “no,” by contrast, we seem to be denying the possibility of truth and objectivity. For how are we to describe anything truly, if the terms in which language forces us to frame all that can be said are set, not by the nature of what is to be described, but by linguistic or social convention?
The dilemma is a characteristically philosophical one; one, certainly, which has occasioned the spilling of much ink by philosophers. But its implications transcend the bounds of philosophy, at least philosophy narrowly considered as what goes on in philosophy departments.
Contents
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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EPILOGUE
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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15 - Paradox and Substitutivity
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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But is language the only language? Why should there not be a mode of expression through which I can talk about language in such a way that it can appear to me in co-ordination with something else?
Ludwig WittgensteinKripke's cautionary lessons
In Chapter 14 we showed that, in “A Puzzle About Belief,” Saul Kripke relies on antecedent commitments to Russell's Principle and Referential Realism, which lead him to embrace a notion of linguistic competence that is both incompatible with the alleged paradox and with ordinary practice. In this chapter we show that the roots of these commitments run deep, so deep that Kripke's Referential Realism would, if successful, allow him to sustain his Millian view of meaning and reference, along with the version of de re essentialism in Naming and Necessity. We argue here that these conclusions are unwarranted: neither Millianism nor de re essentialism are defensible. However, as our earlier arguments show, and as will be more fully spelled out in the Epilogue, this does not result in an abandonment of Realism.
Kripke's paper ends with a cautionary conclusion.
When we enter into the area exemplified by Jones and Pierre, we enter into an area where our normal practices of interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is the notion of the content of someone's assertion, the proposition it expresses. In the present state of our knowledge, I think it would be foolish to draw any conclusions, positive or negative, about substitutivity. […]
12 - Necessity and “Grammar”
- Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, Bernard Harrison, University of Utah
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Essence is expressed by grammar.
– Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investivations, §371Extensionality and the analytic
The central claim of metaphysics is that there are de re necessary truths other than those of mathematics and logic. Metaphysically necessary truths, if such exist, were long held to be characterised by the following combination of features:
they capture the nature of Reality,
they are discoverable by rational reflection alone,
they are immune to disconfirmation at the hands of experience.
More recent and fashionable accounts of de re necessity dispense with (2): we shall come to them in a moment.
The tradition of belief in the accessibility to the mind of de re necessary truth is a very long one. It is commmon to Plato and Aristotle, most mediaeval philosophy, the major seventeenth century Rationalists, Kant and such major successors of Kant as Hegel, along with such twentieth century figures as Husserl and Sartre.
Vienna Circle Positivism, the philosophy of Schlick, Carnap, Reichenbach and Ayer, saw itself as committed to the defence of scientific rationality against all such claims. The positivists – although this is a gross oversimplification – held, by and large, that necessary truths are de dicto; a de dicto necessary truth being one that, although immune to empirical disconfirmation, and discoverable by rational reflection alone, cannot be said to capture the nature of Reality, as de re truths have been supposed to do, since the truth of the former is a consequence merely of the way in which we have chosen to give meaning to the signs of our language.
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