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Contributors
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- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
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- 05 August 2015
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- 27 April 2015, pp ix-xxx
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Harm and the Volenti Principle
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- By Gerald Dworkin, University of California
- Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Fred D. Miller, Jr, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Jeffrey Paul, Bowling Green State University, Ohio
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- New Essays in Political and Social Philosophy
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- 05 June 2014
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- 30 August 2013, pp 309-321
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Summary
This is an essay on the limits of the Criminal Law. In particular, it is about what principles, if any, determine whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalize certain conduct. Joel Feinberg in his great work on the moral limits of the criminal law argues that we need only two principles. One is a principle regulating harm to other people and the other is an offense principle regulating certain kinds of offensive conduct. I examine various aspects of his argument. In particular I concentrate on his use of the Volenti Principle: He who consents cannot be wrongfully harmed by conduct to which he has fully consented. Feinberg uses the principle to argue that certain kinds of consensual conduct cannot be forbidden unless we adopt some kind of legal moralism, that is, unless conduct can be forbidden on the grounds that it is immoral even though the conduct harms no other person. The first section provides an overview of Feinberg's account of the limits of criminalization. The subsequent sections explore the possibility of prohibiting certain kinds of consensual conduct while avoiding legal moralism by limiting the use of the Volenti Principle.
Chapter 1 - Defining paternalism
- Edited by Christian Coons, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Michael Weber, Bowling Green State University, Ohio
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- Paternalism
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- 05 February 2013
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- 14 February 2013, pp 25-38
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This chapter begins by canvassing a wide variety of definitions of paternalism which may have been developed in quite different contexts for quite different purposes. It is helpful both to see how wide the variety is and to see the various dimensions along which the definitions vary. A paternalistic act may be defined in terms of the outcomes it produces. The alternative view is that the reasons which count in determining whether an act is paternalistic are the hypothetical reasons which could motivate or justify the act. The first thing to note is that the entire discussion of paternalism takes place in the larger context of a discussion of the Unconscionability Doctrine (UD) in contract law. There is a normative dispute about the use of the doctrine. Liberals tend to favor it as a way of enabling poor people who are taken advantage of to get out of contractual obligations.
HARM AND THE VOLENTI PRINCIPLE
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Journal:
- Social Philosophy and Policy / Volume 29 / Issue 1 / January 2012
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 14 December 2011, pp. 309-321
- Print publication:
- January 2012
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This is an essay on the limits of the Criminal Law. In particular, it is about what principles, if any, determine whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalize certain conduct. Joel Feinberg in his great work on the moral limits of the criminal law argues that we need only two principles. One is a principle regulating harm to other people and the other is an offense principle regulating certain kinds of offensive conduct. I explore various aspects of his argument. In particular I concentrate on his use of the Volenti Principle: He who consents cannot be wrongfully harmed by conduct to which he has fully consented. Feinberg uses the principle to argue that certain kinds of consensual conduct cannot be forbidden unless we adopt some kind of legal moralism, i.e., conduct can be forbidden on the grounds that it is immoral even though the conduct harms no other person. I explore the possibility of avoiding legal moralism by limiting the use of the Volenti Principle.
12 - Unfair competition: is it time for European harmonization?
- Edited by David Vaver, University of Oxford, Lionel Bently, University of Cambridge
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- Intellectual Property in the New Millennium
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- 25 May 2010
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- 14 October 2004, pp 175-188
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Professor Cornish's pioneering textbook on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights first appeared in 1981. Its rather conservative title no doubt reflected the general lack of familiarity then with the term ‘Intellectual Property’. It was an important area of law, but left to the specialists and their clients; the wider world knew little of it or of its significance. Successive editions of the text have witnessed a transformation; the emergence of intellectual property from a backwater to feature prominently now as valuable property demanding attention from those involved in most forms of economic activity and from politicians and others involved in national and international affairs. There was a paucity of intellectual property literature then; today it is overwhelming.
IP laws, now, are stronger, more extensive, more pervasive, harmonized and globalized than ever could have been contemplated in 1981. TRIPS, introduced to ensure that the legitimate channels of exploitation of intellectual property were not undermined by inadequate laws or ineffective means of monitoring and enforcing them, projected the intellectual property image throughout the world. Thereafter, efforts were made to ratchet up the minimum standards of TRIPS to TRIPS-Plus by international conventions (such as the WIPO Copyright Treaties), international resolutions (such as those affecting trade marks and the internet and well known marks) and, as a surprising recent development, by means of an increasing number of bilateral Free Trade Agreements.
Part One
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- By Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp 1-5
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Summary
We intend to argue that, under certain circumstances, it is morally permissible, and ought to be legally permissible, for physicians to provide the knowledge and/or means by which a patient can take her own life. This facilitation of suicide is what we shall mean by physician-assisted suicide. When we refer to euthanasia we shall mean cases in which the physician performs the last causal step leading to the death of the patient, and thus can be said to kill the patient.
The reasons for favoring physician-assisted suicide are not difficult to determine. They consist mainly of the interests that dying patients have in the process of dying being as painless and dignified as possible. They also rely on the interest of patients in determining the time and manner of their death. Autonomy and relief of suffering are values that we all can agree to be important. But it has seemed to many people that, important as these values are, there are significant objections to allowing physicians to serve these values either by facilitating suicide or by killing their patients. We believe that these objections are mistaken and that once they are seen to be mistaken, the reasons favoring medically assisted dying lead to our conclusions.
Our basic strategy of argument is essentially ad hominem; that is, we will claim that those who oppose medically assisted dying themselves favor policies that cannot be morally distinguished from the policies we favor and they oppose.
Part Two
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp 81-82
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Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
- Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, Sissela Bok
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998
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The moral issues involved in doctors assisting patients to die with dignity are of absolutely central concern to the medical profession, ethicists, and the public at large. The debate is fuelled by cases that extend far beyond passive euthanasia to the active consideration of killing by physicians. The need for a sophisticated but lucid exposition of the two sides of the argument is now urgent. This book supplies that need. Two prominent philosophers, Gerald Dworkin and R. G. Frey present the case for legalization of physician-assisted suicide. One of the best-known ethicists in the US, Sissela Bok, argues the case against.
Frontmatter
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp i-vi
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Contents
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp vii-viii
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1 - The Nature of Medicine
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- By Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Book:
- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp 6-16
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Summary
It is not decent for society to make a man do this to himself.
Probably, this is the last day I will be able to do it to myself.
Percy Bridgman Suicide noteAmong physicians the most frequently heard argument against physician-assisted suicide is one about the nature of the medical profession. It is argued that the norms of medicine prohibit a physician from ever acting with the intent to kill a patient or to aid him in killing himself. For this reason it is essential, they believe, to maintain a sharp distinction between allowing patients to die, say by the refusal to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and acts of assisted suicide.
Certainly the most important and influential article defending this view is one by Leon Kass. It is almost impossible to find an article opposing medically assisted dying in any of the major medical journals, such as the New England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association, that does not cite this article as establishing the view that physicians must not aid patients in dying. We propose, therefore, to critically examine Kass's arguments.
Kass begins by considering “the question about physicians killing (as) a special case of – but not thereby identical to – this general question: May or ought one kill people who ask to be killed.” Note the phrase “may or ought,” which will assume some importance as Kass develops his argument.
4 - Public Policy and Physician-Assisted Suidde
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- By Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago
- Gerald Dworkin, University of Illinois, Chicago, R. G. Frey, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Sissela Bok, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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- Book:
- Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
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- 05 August 2014
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- 28 August 1998, pp 64-80
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Summary
You should not act justly now for fear of raising expectations that you may act still more justly in the future.
Let us assume that we can find a plausible case for the view that it is permissible for medical care givers, under certain conditions, either to provide their patients with the means and/or information so that they can take their own lives, or to themselves kill their patients. Let us also suppose that, under certain conditions, care givers ought to provide such assistance in dying. We may think that this “ought,” while it grounds a claim, does not take the form of a right.
Having established this much still does not settle a number of different issues concerning public policy, questions such as: Should the law recognize such a right? Should the institutions of medical practice, such as hospitals, have rules that require action in accordance with such a right? Should the codes of the medical profession include such rules? Ought the profession sanction professionals who violate such claims? This class of questions is one about institutionalizing a right to die.
In general, the establishment of some moral claim or right is at most a necessary condition for the establishment of such an institutional right. That such claims are not sufficient is clear from the fact that although it is quite wrong of us to lie to you about many things, it is not illegal to do so (except for special cases such as commercial fraud).
Equal Respect and the Enforcement of Morality*
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Journal:
- Social Philosophy and Policy / Volume 7 / Issue 2 / Spring 1990
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 13 January 2009, pp. 180-193
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- Spring 1990
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In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the question of when, if ever, the state may use coercion to enforce majority views about what types of conduct are right or wrong, noble or base, decent or indecent. Such interest has been generated by both political and philosophibal pressures. In recent political history, controversies over such issues as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, textbooks in schools, new reproductive technologies such as surrogate parenting and in vitro fertilization, and faith healing have focused attention on the role of the state in supporting or opposing various moral views. In political philosophy, often a theoretical reflection of the political debates of the time, we have seen renewed attempts to provide a satisfactory foundation for traditional liberal (in the sense of Millian) views of the legitimate scope of state power. In particular, there has been an emphasis on the neutrality of the liberal state and the right of individuals to be treated as equals by the state.
PART I - THEORY
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Book:
- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 1-2
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2 - The value of autonomy
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Book:
- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 21-33
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Summary
I have outlined a conception of autonomy; a conception that is in various ways different from other conceptions of autonomy that have historically been developed. One way of attacking such a conception is by arguing that it does not fulfill the evaluative tasks that have traditionally been associated with the notion. In this chapter I wish to defend the conception developed in Chapter 1 against a certain attack and then to argue for the value of exercising autonomy when understood in this way.
There is a traditional view of autonomy that must view my conception as too thin to be of value because there is no specific content to the decisions an autonomous person takes. Suppose we have a person who has not been subjected to the kinds of influence – whatever they turn out to be – that interfere with procedural independence. Suppose the person wants to conduct his or her life in accordance with the following: Do whatever my mother or my buddies or my leader or my priest tells me to do. Such a person counts, in my view, as autonomous. But has not such a person clearly forfeited autonomy? Must autonomy involve a particular content, a substantive and not merely procedural independence from others?
I shall argue that the conception of autonomy that insists upon substantive independence is not one that has a claim to our respect as an ideal.
7 - Autonomy and informed consent
- Gerald Dworkin
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- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 100-120
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Summary
“Why do you assume you have the right to decide for someone else? Don't you agree it's a terrifying right, one that rarely leads to good? You should be careful. No one's entitled to it, not even doctors.”
“But doctors are entitled to the right – doctors above all,” exclaimed Dontsova with deep conviction. By now she was really angry. “Without that right there'd be no such thing as medicine!”
Solzhenitsyn, Cancer WardThe slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests – and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices upon freemen – he enters into a discourse with the patient and with his friends – and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him: at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure.
Plato, The LawsIn ethics, as in the law, there is often agreement concerning what to do in a particular case, or about the importance of a moral principle, co-existing with disagreement about why we should act in a certain manner, or on the nature or basis of the moral principle. Similarly, moral theories may agree about specific cases of lying while giving different accounts of why a lie is or is not justified.
Contents
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Book:
- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 26 August 1988, pp vii-viii
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PART II - PRACTICE
- Gerald Dworkin
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- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 83-84
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9 - The serpent beguiled me and I did eat: entrapment and the creation of crime
- Gerald Dworkin
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- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 130-149
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Summary
In the past few years a number of criminal prosecutions have brought to public attention the issue of entrapment: Abscam, the DeLorean cocaine trial, Operation Greylord, various sting fencing operations. The investigative techniques used in, say, Abscam, although highly elaborate, expensive, and ingenious are only one example of the range of investigative techniques with which I shall be concerned in this essay. What these techniques have in common is the use of deception to produce the performance of a criminal act under circumstances in which it can be observed by law enforcement officials. I shall use the term “pro-active enforcement” to cover such techniques and the question I shall be discussing is under what circumstances, if any, is the use of such measures legitimate.
Let me begin by saying something more about the nature of proactive law enforcement and also by giving a fairly extensive sample of the use of such techniques. The sample will not only make clearer the nature of such operations but also provide a range of cases for testing judgments about the acceptability of such techniques.
Traditionally, law enforcement in our society has left most of the burden of reporting criminal offenses to private citizens. It is left to individuals, usually victims, to come forward with a complaint of criminal action and to provide much of the evidence in identifying and prosecuting the criminal. Government's role has been limited to various patrol activities and to reaction to complaint.
4 - Autonomy, science, and morality
- Gerald Dworkin
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- Book:
- The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 August 1988, pp 48-61
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Summary
The concept of autonomy has assumed increasing importance in contemporary moral theory. Appeals to the ideal of an autonomous moral agent play a role in grounding moral argument that appeals to sentiment or self-evidence or intuition played in earlier centuries. In such discussions moral judgments are often contrasted with factual or scientific judgments and claims are made about autonomy (as well as related notions such as authority and objectivity) in the moral context that are sharply distinguished from parallel claims in the scientific context. My aim in this essay is, as they say on prelims, to compare and contrast the nature of autonomy in morality and science.
In Chapter 1, I have characterized autonomy as the capacity of a person critically to reflect upon, and then attempt to accept or change, his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals. The idea of moral autonomy is a particular case of this, and the rough idea is that persons are responsible for, and have the capacity for, determining for themselves the nature of the moral reasons, considerations, and principles on which they will act.
When I speak of autonomy I shall take this to be a property of persons and I shall only indirectly be concerned with the discussion that has proceeded under the heading of the autonomy of morality, that is, the connection or lack of connection between facts and values. I am primarily concerned with autonomy as specifying certain features of persons involved in their deliberations upon moral issues. I am concerned with moral autonomy and not the autonomy of morals.