A Pyrrhonist's researches do not end in discovery; nor yet do they conclude that discovery is impossible. For they do not terminate at all: the researches continue (PH 1.1, 4), and the researcher finds himself in a condition of ἐποχή (PH 1.7). Έποχή is defined as ‘a standstill of the intellect, as a result of which we neither deny nor affirm anything’ (PH 1.10). The Sceptical investigator neither asserts nor denies, neither believes nor disbelieves.
Έποχή is characteristically produced by argument - indeed, one of the most refreshing features of the Pyrrhonist tracts of Sextus Empiricus is that they are stuffed full of argumentation. When a philosopher offers us an argument, he normally implies that, if we accept the premisses, we ought to accept the conclusion. It is thus natural to suppose that a Pyrrhonist's arguments similarly imply an intellectual ought: ‘Consider these premisses’, the Sceptic urges, ‘and you will see that you should suspend judgement’. A few Pyrrhonian passages do indeed contain such an intellectual ought; but those passages are, I think, misleading. Sextus usually says, not ‘you should suspend judgement’, but ‘you will (or: must) suspend judgement’.