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101 results

Page 1 of 6

  • Off-Balance: How US Courts Privilege Conservative Policy Outcomes

  • Brian Highsmith, Maya Sen, Kathleen Thelen
  • Journal:
    Perspectives on Politics , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 February 2025, pp. 1-13

  • A growing literature has challenged some of the more influential accounts regarding the role of courts in the development of social and economic policy in the United States. We highlight some of the more durable features of the American federal judiciary that together tend to privilege ideologically conservative outcomes on matters of politics and public policy. Situating the United States in a comparative perspective, we build our argument in three parts. First, we review interdisciplinary accounts documenting how institutional features of US courts—including the unusually strong powers of judicial review—can tilt outcomes in a conservative-leaning direction. Second, we document how these formidable powers interact with judicial selection processes that currently skew the composition of the judiciary in favor of conservative candidates. Third, we show how the combination of the two factors—institutional and compositional—biases federal courts’ interventions toward privileging conservative policy outcomes.

  • In Memoriam: Sven Steinmo

  • BO ROTHSTEIN, KATHLEEN THELEN
  • Journal:
    Political Science Today / Volume 4 / Issue 4 / November 2024
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 January 2025, pp. 14-15
    Print publication:
    November 2024
    • Article
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  • In Memoriam: Frances McCall Rosenbluth

  • MALA HTUN, DAWN TEELE, KATHLEEN THELEN
  • Journal:
    Political Science Today / Volume 2 / Issue 1 / February 2022
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 March 2022, pp. 21-22
    Print publication:
    February 2022
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  • 2 - The Role of the Law in the American Political Economy

  • from I - Political Arenas and Actors
  • Edited by Jacob S. Hacker, Yale University, Connecticut, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Columbia University, New York, Paul Pierson, University of California, Berkeley, Kathleen Thelen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book:
    The American Political Economy
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    11 November 2021, pp 76-102

  • Summary

    On the same day that the White House announced the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court, it turned to business groups to aid in the public relations campaign to secure his confirmation (Goldstein 2018). Once seated, Kavanaugh solidified a strong pro-business orientation on the nation’s highest court, an orientation further consolidated with the eleventh-hour appointment of Amy Coney Barrett in the run-up to the November 2020 election. Meanwhile, the entire federal bench was also being transformed through the confirmations – at an unprecedented pace – of a string of young conservative jurists in the Trump administration (Ruiz et al. 2020). Most of the newest additions are drawn from the membership lists of the Federalist Society, a powerful organization composed of lawyers and legal scholars committed to an originalist reading of the American constitution and a radical free market economic ideology.

The American Political Economy
  • Politics, Markets, and Power
  • Edited by Jacob S. Hacker, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Paul Pierson, Kathleen Thelen
  • Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    11 November 2021
  • This volume brings together leading political scientists to explore the distinctive features of the American political economy. The introductory chapter provides a comparatively informed framework for analyzing the interplay of markets and politics in the United States, focusing on three key factors: uniquely fragmented and decentralized political institutions; an interest group landscape characterized by weak labor organizations and powerful, parochial business groups; and an entrenched legacy of ethno-racial divisions embedded in both government and markets. Subsequent chapters look at the fundamental dynamics that result, including the place of the courts in multi-venue politics, the political economy of labor, sectional conflict within and across cities and regions, the consolidation of financial markets and corporate monopoly and monopsony power, and the ongoing rise of the knowledge economy. Together, the chapters provide a revealing new map of the politics of democratic capitalism in the United States.

  • 12 - The Anxiety of Precarity

  • from Part III - Politics
  • Edited by Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Yale University, Connecticut, Margaret Weir, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book:
    Who Gets What?
    Published online:
    20 August 2021
    Print publication:
    29 July 2021, pp 281-306

  • Summary

    This chapter explores the dynamics of precarity and socioeconomic risk across the most advanced industrial countries.  We situate the United States in a comparative framework to identify the characteristics it shares with other rich democracies as well as the distinctive dynamics of precarity in the American context.  The United States stands out for the way it combines uncommonly high levels of individual-level exposure to various risks with low levels of collectively provided insurance to mitigate the impact of these risks. Moreover, we show that the institutions of the American political economy operate to compound risk, actively promoting what we call risk contagion, as misfortune in one arena spreads to foment misfortune in others.

  • Institutional Sources of Business Power

  • Marius R. Busemeyer, Kathleen Thelen
  • Journal:
    World Politics / Volume 72 / Issue 3 / July 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 July 2020, pp. 448-480
    Print publication:
    July 2020

  • Recent years have seen a revival of debates about the role of business and the sources of business power in postindustrial political economies. Scholarly accounts commonly distinguish between structural sources of business power, connected to its privileged position in capitalist economies, and instrumental sources, related to direct forms of lobbying by business actors. The authors argue that this distinction overlooks an important third source of business power, which they conceptualize as institutional business power. Institutional business power results when state actors delegate public functions to private business actors. Over time, through policy feedback and lock-in effects, institutional business power contributes to an asymmetrical dependence of the state on the continued commitment of private business actors. This article elaborates the theoretical argument behind this claim, providing empirical examples of growing institutional business power in education in Germany, Sweden, and the United States.

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