Chapter 16, As for the future of England (August 21 - September 17). As the Banque de France and NY Fed loans to Bank of England are used, a French and US loan to the British government is contemplated and arranged through J.P. Morgan and with assistance from the NY Fed and Banque de France. The arrangement leads to the ’bankers’ ramp’ accusations and the relationship between Harrison and Harvey deteriorates. Harrison visits Norman who is unhappy with the Bank for England’s and Harvey’s actions and the decision to peg sterling to the US dollar at 4.86. J. P. Morgan also question the policy of the Bank of England and wonders why Harvey doesn’t raise the bank rate. Harvey seems to be focused on forcing the British government to cut the budget, adn the BIS argues that Great Britain is now the European country with the most serious financial conditions.

In chapter 6, Guarantee at last? (May 26 - June 1), it becomes clear that even though the Austrian parliament passed a law authorizing the government to guarantee Credit Anstalt’s deposits, the struggle is far from over. It is difficult to get information from Credit Anstalt and nervousness about Germany and reparations grows as the Austrian crisis is also developing into a currency crisis. International bankers set up an International Creditors Committee, while the BIS and the Bank of England insist on controllers being associated with the Credit Anstalt and the Austrian National Bank (ANB). Norman confesses to have difficulty separating cause and effect and he grows impatient with the BIS and the ANB.

In chapter 15, Going off the gold standard? (July 14 - August 21) attention shifts to Great Britain and the weakness of sterling. As pressure on sterling increases, Norman fall sick with ’stress’ and he has to take leave of absence from the bank in late July, only to return after Britain has left gold on September 21, 1931. With Norman out of the picture, his deputy Ernest Harvey takes over as the Banque de France and the New York Fed arrange a $200 million credit to the Bank of England. Tensions arise between Harvey on the one hand and Clément Moret (Banque de France) and Harrison on the other, about the use of the credit. The weakening of sterling continues and in late August, Harry Siepmann writes an ominous note discussing the consequences of Great Britain leaving gold.

Chapter 9, Where and how to place (June 8 - June 13) the question of the placement of the government loan comes front and center. Since the second BIS loan to ANB is conditional upon the placement of the bond loan, the National Bank is increasingly under pressure and the money supply has increased as it has rediscounted for the Credit Anstalt. The CA has no more solid collateral and ANB is losing foreign exchange at an increasing rate. Meantime, Hungary is also suffering from capital flight and the nervousness over contagion and the psychology of the crisis is increasing. The conflicts between the Austrian government and the central banks increases and information is still very hard to come by, all of which contributes to the uncertainty of the situation.

In chapter 7, Releasing the BIS credit (May 29 - June 5), the BIS credit of 150 million schilling is released to the ANB as a moratorium is averted and a guarantee. Meantime, the issue of an Austrian government loan, re-emerges and it becomes clear that the French may not be able to or wanting to take the lead in organizing the loan. In Basel, the BIS is getting ready for the upcoming board and governors’ meeting, where the decision about another credit to the ANB will have to be discussed. Rodd prepares several notes and a plan for the meeting.

In chapter 3, preparing for crisis, the narrative begins. It is told mainly chronologically and this chapter deals with the period between May 11 and May 19, but only after a brief focus on January 1931 where Harry Siepmann on the basis of the socalled Bagehot model considers what to do in case of a major financial crisis in Europe. The Bagehot model for a lender of last resort and its inadequacy in the face of an international crisis, is a theme that goes through the book’s narrative. On May 11 the Credit Anstalt failure is made known and the central bankers get ready to make sense of the information they get from Austria and elsewhere. The BIS sends Francis Rodd to Vienna and the chapter follows him closely as he communicates his findings back to the BIS and Bank of England. In a world where debt is abundant and credit scarce, Rodd presents a plan to the upcoming BIS board meeting.

In chapter 11, To act now if we are to act at all (June 16 - Jun 27) the relative calm in Austria is followed by increasing concern about Germany which looses foreign exchange. The Bank of England, the New York Fed, the Banque de France and the Bank for International Settlements arranges a $100 million credit to the Reichsbank. Meanwhile,on June 20, US President Herbert Hoover announces his plan for a one year moratorium, which is received positively in most of Europe, but not in France. George Harrison assumes a more active role in trying to defuse the concern about a breakdown in Europe, and he enters into dialogue with the Banque de France, which is more open to a solution than the French government. The chapter ends with some optimism that the Hoover proposal may have changed the situation in Europe.

Chapter 13, Germany will collapse (June 19 - July 10) begins with everyone’s eyes on Germany where the uncertainty about the French position towards the Hoover plan increases every day. More generally, politics comes to play a larger role, as Norman increasingly emphasizes that it’s about politics, and Harrison has to take Hoover’s plan into account. At the same time leadership in the epistemic community of central bankers shifts away from Norman toward Harrison, who enters into a dialogue with French central bankers. Tensions arise between Norman and Harrison, as the begin to subscribe to divergent narratives of the situation and what needs to be done. In Germany, the situation gets more concerning by the hour, and Hans Luther travels to London and Paris in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a giant credit to the Reichsbank.

Chapter 4, Moratorium or guarantee (May 25 - May 27), traces the communications between central and private bankers as they realize that a moratorium may be on its way. Central and private bankers increasingly try to avoid a moratorium and Norman uses his network to get the international creditors to organize themselves. There is an increasing sense of urgency and uncertainty, but it seems that the BIS and central banks are successful in averting a moratorium and getting a guarantee instead. There are still many unknowns, however, and the occasional conflict in the epistemic community also appears.

After a brief introduction to the outbreak of the Austrian Credit Anstalt crisis in May 1931 and the early response by central bankers from Bank of England, the BIS and the New York Federal Reserve Bank, this chapter proceeds to present the book’s overall issues and main concepts, which will be used as a heuristic framework throughout the narrative. The main concepts of the book are radical uncertainty, sensemaking, narrative emplotment, imagined futures and epistemic communities. In the chapter, I discuss how these concepts are helpful in understanding central bankers’, and other actors’, decision-making and practices in the five month from May through September. The chapter also discusses my analytical strategy and presents the empirical material, which comes from the Bank of England, Bank for International Settlements, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the J.P. Morgan Archive, the Rothschild Archive and a few others. At the end of the chapter, I present the structure of the book.

Chapter 11, Francis Rodd makes sense - and a plot, (June 9 - June 20). In this chapter I change focus to Rodd’s retrospective sensemaking. I quote in full a long note by Rodd written in the aftermath of the loan from Bank of England where he tells his narrative of what happened from the BIS board meeting on June 8 to June 16. Rodd clearly blame the French government, but not the Banque de France. After this, the perspectiev shifts to that of Pierre Quesnay, who tells his view about the British loan and how it came about. The chapter ends by showing how Rodd leaving Vienna.

Chapter 10, A world political problem (June 11 - June 16). This chapter recounts the endgame of the Austrian crisis, while instability spreads to Germany. Norman comes to realize that in reality there is not much the central banks can do, since the real issue is "a world political problem" going all the way back to the Versaille Peace Agreement of 1919, the German war reparations and the allied’s war debts. The International Creditors Committee negotiate in Vienna with the Credit Anstalt and the Austrian government and at the very last minute they succeed in getting guarantee for their deposits, while promising to leave them for at least two years. At the same time, on June 16, negotiations with French bankers over the Austrian bond loans fails, and the Bank of England singlehandedly steps in with a bridge credit to the government. Together, the loan and the standstill agreement stops the Austrian crisis, at least for a while.