Plotinus focuses on eternity (aiôn) and time (khronos) in treatise 3.7 On Eternity and Time.1 His views are rooted in the earlier tradition and are developed through an interpretation of both Plato (in particular the Timaeus) and Aristotle (in particular Physics 4). Yet Plotinus does not merely resume what had previously been stated by his authorities; his exegetical approach is based on the presentation of distinctive views that are connected to Plotinus’ metaphysical outlook, in particular to his theory of intelligible principles. Plotinus’ discussion of eternity and time is actually centred on (1) the notion of eternity as the lack of duration and extension in time (so Plotinus distinguishes eternity from everlastingness), (2) the idea that time is associated with the activity of the soul rather than with the movement of bodies, (3) the notion of ‘life’ as a mode of being that characterizes, in different ways, both the Intellect and the soul and accounts for the nature of eternity and time as well as for the derivation of time from eternity.

The present chapter aims to show the connection between the ethical views of early Neoplatonist philosophers (Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus) and their metaphysical doctrines concerning the hierarchy of being. In the first section, it is argued that Plotinus focuses on virtues within the framework of a discussion about how the embodied soul can revert to the intelligible god (Enn. 1.2(19)). According to Plotinus the intelligible god has no virtues: there are paradigms of virtues in the Intellect, but these are not the virtues themselves. This is consistent with Plotinus’ view that different levels in the hierarchy of being are heterogeneous and do not share the same properties. Plotinus’ approach makes the status of political virtues problematic. Sections two and three focus on Porphyry and Iamblichus respectively. Their arrangements of the levels of virtues are connected to their accounts of the hierarchy of being, which are different both from that of Plotinus and from each other. Porphyry’s account in Sent. 32 is based on the idea that the cause pre-contains what depends on it (hence Porphyry’s emphasis on paradigmatic virtues). Iamblichus’ account seems to rely on his view that different levels in the hierarchy are connected via analogy.

The distinction between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is controversial, but it remains helpful in that it makes it clear that there are important differences in the philosophical background of Platonist philosophers before and after Plotinus.1 One of these differences resides in their knowledge of Aristotle’s treatises. It can plausibly be argued that Platonist philosophers, from at least Eudorus of Alexandria onward (first century bc), regarded Aristotle as an authority, though not unqualifiedly so, and though his status was clearly inferior to that of Plato.2 Eudorus of Alexandria was certainly involved in the early debates on Aristotle’s Categories, and we know from Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. 58.25–59.8) that Eudorus proposed an emendation to Aristotle’s report on Plato’s theory of principles at Metaph.

In Galen's mind, Plato is certainly the highest philosophical authority. While this is not a disputed fact, Galen's own philosophical allegiance is an altogether different matter: can he be reckoned among the (Middle) Platonists of his time? The answers provided to this question vary from positive to negative and to anywhere in between. Galen was no doubt well acquainted with the kind of Platonism taught in the schools: when he was fourteen years old, his father Nicon had him attend lectures by Stoic, Platonic, Epicurean and Peripatetic teachers. Galen never mentions their names, but in the case of three of these teachers he does mention the names of their masters (the Stoic Philopator, the Platonist Gaius and the Peripatetic Aspasius). However, Platonists (and, more generally, scholastic philosophers) did not arouse his admiration: Galen comments disparagingly on their lack of rigour and on their futile, irreconcilable disputes. Such divergences would have led Galen to embrace Pyrrhonian scepticism, had he not been ‘saved’ by geometry and its cognate disciplines: Galen presents geometry, not speculative philosophy, as his model for demonstrative science.

These are all well-known facts, but are not enough to solve the problem of Galen's Platonism. Galen's contemptuous remarks about contemporary philosophers should not, perhaps, be given too much weight. Scholars have argued that Galen depends not only on Plato, but also on the Platonism of his time: this is shown (inter alia) by his conception of god and providence, by his ethics and by his epistemology.