Individuals who particularly like or dislike a president or presidential candidate may, through a process of motivated reasoning, personally support or oppose the politician’s policy positions as a consequence. I examine the extent to which attitudes toward Donald Trump shaped public opinion on immigration policy, a case that appears to invite motivated reasoning. I estimate the influence of attitudes about Trump by comparing them directly to views of Barack Obama and trade policy using large reputable national surveys. I find a material, if limited, Trump effect. Trump polarized Americans on immigration considerably. However, the polarization was not along racial or ethnic lines. Moreover, any Trump effect on immigration appears not to have been as large as that he brought to bear on trade. Contrary to some recent work, such an effect also appears to have elevated immigration only marginally in the list of those deemed important.

How do perceptions of demographic change affect the strength of white identity and corresponding attitudes toward immigrants, immigration and personal perceptions of victimhood? While white identity has received scholarly attention in the United States, we know much less about its effects in Canada. We conducted a preregistered survey experiment in which we exposed respondents to different framings on Canada’s increasing ethnic diversity. We find that perceiving demographic change increases feelings of white identity, particularly when framed as an increase in Canada’s visible minority or immigrant population. However, exposure to these trends does not in turn robustly affect respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants, immigration admission preferences or own perceptions of personal victimhood. These findings suggest that white identity is both present and can be primed in Canada; however, it has not yet been politically mobilized in the same way as in other contexts, such as the United States.

Conservative parties and politicians are often caught in a dilemma regarding immigration policies. Business interest groups and xenophobic populist forces both support conservative political parties but expect fundamentally different immigration policies. Japan is a rare case among advanced democracies that has experienced neither large-scale immigration nor the emergence of xenophobic populism. Yet, Japan’s conservative government, facing the reality of a rapidly aging and declining population, has begun to loosen immigration policy. We analyze the ruling party politicians’ policy positions on foreign worker intake and demonstrate that their views have shifted in a pro-foreign-worker direction, especially among legislators representing rural areas that have seen a sharp increase in foreign residents.

Public perceptions of immigration are often inaccurate, yet research lacks conceptual clarity and valid measurement of these misperceptions. Prior work focuses mainly on population innumeracy (misestimating immigrant shares) and cannot distinguish genuine misperceptions from mere guessing. We introduce a survey module that captures multiple dimensions of immigration-related perceptions alongside respondents’ confidence in their estimates. Using population survey data from Switzerland, we develop confidence-weighted indicators that separate misperception from guessing. Although inaccurate perceptions are widespread across several immigration domains, they are less prevalent than often assumed; guessing accounts for a substantial share of observed inaccuracy. This measurement strategy enables more precise empirical tests of theories linking perceptions to political attitudes and behavior.

Central to the UK’s Referendum on EU membership, immigration concerns underpinned support for Leave. This article examines ethnic minority support for Brexit, comparing their immigration attitudes with white British voters. Why immigrants and ethnic minorities would support immigration controls through voting Leave presents a theoretical puzzle with existing research finding they generally hold positive attitudes to immigration. Drawing on focus groups and interviews, I find opposition to Eastern European immigration motivated ethnic minority Leave support, who bolstered their own position as “good” immigrants while denigrating Eastern Europeans as “bad” immigrants. This echoes emerging trends of minoritized groups opposing newer migrants, including increased Latino/x support for Trump in 2024. White British Leave voters, however, rarely distinguished between EU and non-EU migrants, often including British ethnic minorities in their “mental image” of immigrants. Thus, tighter borders may do little to quell qualms over immigration which (partly) reflect concerns over rising racial diversity.

Political polarization is a group phenomenon in which opposing factions, often of unequal size, exhibit asymmetrical influence and behavioral patterns. Within these groups, elites and masses operate under different motivations and levels of influence, challenging simplistic views of polarization. Yet, existing methods for measuring polarization in social networks typically reduce it to a single value, assuming homogeneity in polarization across the entire system. While such approaches confirm the rise of political polarization in many social contexts, they overlook structural complexities that could explain its underlying mechanisms. We propose a method that decomposes existing polarization and alignment measures into distinct components. These components separately capture polarization processes involving elites and masses from opposing groups. Applying this method to Twitter discussions surrounding the 2019 and 2023 Finnish parliamentary elections, we find that (1) opposing groups rarely have a balanced contribution to observed polarization, and (2) while elites strongly contribute to structural polarization and consistently display greater alignment across various topics, the masses, too, have recently experienced a surge in alignment. Our method provides an improved analytical lens through which to view polarization, explicitly recognizing the complexity of and need to account for elite-mass dynamics in polarized environments.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, subnational regions have become increasingly polarized with regard to anti-immigration attitudes. However, the reasons behind geographical changes over time are unclear. We argue that regional labor market risks are a key and overlooked factor driving residential choices and subsequent attitudinal change. We rely on georeferenced panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) in combination with rich regional labor market data from the German microcensus. Our findings confirm that prospects of economic risk reduction drive moving decisions and subsequently reduce anti-immigration sentiment, especially among workers with transferable skills. This has decisive macro-level implications: regions receiving a large share of risk-reducing movers over time show lower levels of anti-immigration sentiment. Our contribution implies that economic motivations matter for residential choices beyond cultural sorting, individual attitudes adjust to the conditions of destination, and geographical patterns are mostly driven by booming regions becoming ever more liberal.

Over the last decade, the Scottish Government have pursued a positive, highly visible immigration politics, despite Scotland lacking formal immigration powers and being enveloped within a United Kingdom that has simultaneously pursued an increasingly securitised approach. With securitisation intensifying globally, coupled with a rise in, and political success of, anti-immigration parties and actors, this article investigates the question of why the Scottish Government has pursued a desecuritising approach – a neglected strand of (de)securitisation studies that principally focuses on the how. We draw on insights from ontological security studies to investigate the Scottish Government’s desecuritisation activity between 2014 and 2024, demonstrating that, whilst there are rationalist-materialist explanations, desecuritisation was not inevitable. Instead, by exploring the relationship between immigration and the construction of the Scottish self at the ontological level we can more fully understand the drivers behind desecuritisation. Pursuing a desecuritised immigration politics is shown, first, to support the Scottish Government’s core autobiographical narrative about who ‘Scotland’ is (open, welcoming, and internationalist), and second, through nurturing a Lacanian fantasy, to be affectively rewarding. Last, the article contributes to the (re)conceptualisation of linearity and temporality in (de)securitisation studies, showcasing contemporary-orientated desecuritisation moves dovetailing with moves aimed at an institutional ‘future-proofing’ of desecuritised immigration governance.

We study bias in judicial authorities’ efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate immigrant offenders into society. Our empirical strategy leverages a distinctive feature of the German criminal code: the optional application of rehabilitative juvenile criminal law or punitive general criminal law for eighteen- to twenty-year-old offenders, based on a subjective assessment of offenders’ psychological ‘maturity’ by judges. Drawing on complete records of 792,000 court hearings between 2009 and 2018, we show that immigrant offenders are about ten percentage points less likely to be sentenced under juvenile law compared to natives convicted for the same crime. The immigrant–native gap in rehabilitative justice correlates with anti-immigrant sentiment across space and has spiked in recent years, suggesting a link between the salience of group-based identities and judicial decision-making. Our findings raise concerns about equal legal treatment and highlight that biases in the application of rehabilitative justice may contribute to higher recidivism rates among immigrant offenders.

This article investigates how early modern migrants articulated identification with their host society in the context of the late eighteenth-century Dutch Republic, a period preceding modern nationalism. Drawing on a unique dataset derived from the Prize Papers – a collection of testimonies from captured sailors interrogated by British Admiralty courts – we analyze migrants’ declarations of sovereign allegiance. We assess how factors such as duration of residence, local citizenship (poorterschap), occupational rank, and marital status influenced migrants’ identification with their adopted polity. Using logistic regression, we find that civic institutional embeddedness, reflected in city citizenship, and occupational rank, especially among ship captains, significantly predicted identification with the Dutch Republic. In contrast, duration of residence and marital status had weak and statistically insignificant effects. Our findings highlight that pre-national forms of identification were deeply embedded in civic and institutional contexts rather than simply reflecting modern nationalist sentiments. By combining quantitative analysis with targeted archival research into individual biographies, this study demonstrates the complex interplay between institutional opportunities and personal networks in shaping migrants’ allegiances, thereby offering a nuanced historical perspective relevant to contemporary debates on civic integration.

Despite a heavy philosophical focus on issues pertaining to immigration, little discussion is taken up that examines the duties we owe to migrant children. This article works to bridge the gap between global justice literature and work on children’s autonomy and well-being. To capture what migrant children experience in the context of immigration and detention, the article examines the conditions on the island country of Nauru, where at least 222 migrant children experienced detention between the years of 2013 and 2019. Using this lived experience as an example, the article argues that we owe children specific positive duties, which are further supported by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Throughout this article, the aim is to indicate how migrant children occupy a particularly vulnerable and nonautonomous status in the context of detention. Because of this, children are owed especially weighty positive duties that are not discussed in the current global justice literature.