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This chapter continues the exploration of the gap between legal theories on the conduct of war and enemy aliens on the one hand and the practice of states at war on the other. It focuses first of all on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 that anticipated the mobilization of the nation-in-arms and examines, in particular, the expulsion of "Germans" from Paris and Strasbourg in the summer of 1870, the consequences of the expulsion and the lively debate among international lawyers it sparked. The chapter continues with an analysis of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, concentrating on the emergence of a humanitarian discourse in order to legitimize intervention. Then it moves east to take into consideration the treatment of enemy aliens and the accompanying discourses on civilization in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. This chapter also delves into the novelties that occurred in the field of international law and international relations with the signing of the Geneva Convention, the foundation of the Institute of International Law in Brussels, the two Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. The final part of the chapter concentrates on the Balkan conflicts of 1912–1913 and the atrocities against civilians.
This introductory chapter sketches the main argument of the book and the various areas of interest it touches upon: sovereignty, international law and laws of war, the dilemma security versus freedom, the attempt at humanizing the war conduct, the transformation of notions and practices of citizenship, rights, individual and human in particular, humanitarianism, national belonging, war and society. The introduction focuses in particular on whether there were consolidated customary practices and codified rules to deal with aliens of enemy nationality at the moment of the outbreak of the First World War, and if and how that conflict represented a watershed. It then presents the structure of the book.
This chapter opens the second part of the book and is the first of six entirely devoted to the First World War. It concentrates on the early months of the war and examines first of all the spread of the state of emergency throughout Europe and the British Empire. It then, while calculating the number of enemy aliens in the belligerent countries, describes the first measures against enemy aliens adopted by Britain, France, the Russian Empire and Japan on the one hand, and those taken by Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It also spells out the diplomatic attempts at protecting enemy aliens, the reactions of the victims of the earliest provisions and the attitudes of the nationalistic public opinion, the spy fever, the spread of fake news and the popular responses to them. By the end of December 1914, each of the early participants in the war had set in motion the mechanism for dealing with enemy aliens. By the same date, the war against them had also become global, ranging from Europe to North America, from Oceania to India or Iran.
This chapter opens the first part of the book that presents the background of the First World War. It deals with the emergence of the concept of “enemy alien” in the debate among international lawyers. Starting with the Law of Nations published by Emer de Vattel in 1758, it analyzes and discusses what the foundational texts of international law in the century-and-a-half preceding the First World War said on the rights of foreigners in peacetime and on the conduct toward these same foreigners when they became enemies in wartime. It then compares legal doctrines and practices analyzing the behavior of belligerents towards enemy aliens in a string of interstate wars that occurred between the end of the eighteenth century and 1865, namely the French Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1793, the Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States, the Crimean War and the American Civil War. The chapter follows the changes in the attitude toward enemy aliens that mass conscription and the post-French Revolution concept of citizenship and nationality triggered.
This chapter examines official attitudes toward aliens in peacetime during the nineteenth century by focusing first of all on their rights in a period characterized by sovereignty, nation-building, solidification of borders and the issue and reform of citizenship laws on the one hand, and on the emergence of globalization, migration and the construction of an international society on the other. The chapter delves into the debates on the right of asylum, expulsion, expatriation, and examines early policies of migration control and the dilemma of reconciling rights and freedom of movement with emerging anti-alienism that precipitated into violence. The second part of the chapter concentrates on citizenship as a legal device, exploring first of all practices of collective acquisition of citizenship triggered by annexations of territories, creation of new nation-states, plebiscites and option regimes incorporated in international treaties. It then deals with individual acquisition and loss of citizenship (naturalization and denaturalization), paying particular attention to the gender dimension of citizenship, conscription, dual citizenship and the ethnic shift in citizenship practices and notions that began to emerge at the turn of the century.
In 1914, the Government of India passed the Ingress into India Ordinance in an attempt to limit the transgressive potential of Ghadar propaganda and transnational revolutionary networks based out of North America and parts of East and South East Asia. The following year, the passage of the Defence of India Act sought to target revolutionaries whom the government deemed to be either in league with Germany, or whose acts of anti-colonial violence aided and assisted the German war effort. Following the conclusion of the war in 1918, colonial officials issued the controversial Rowlatt Act, despite the disapproval of an increasingly vocal Indian public. By tracing the debates and discussions surrounding the passage of these three pieces of 'emergency' legislation, this chapter demonstrates how executive discourses sought to construct and deploy distinct notions of 'the enemy' as a means of legitimizing extraordinary laws meant to target the political challenge of anti-colonial nationalism.
The interwar period in India was a time of great political upheaval, with the development of unprecedented mass support for the politics of anti-colonial nationalism. This period also marked the climax of the revolutionary movement in Bengal, as radicals disenchanted by the failure of the non-cooperation campaign soon returned to the tactics of assassination and political violence that they adopted before and during the war. In 1925, the return of revolutionary organizations prompted the Government of India to introduce the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, despite vigorous opposition from within the newly expanded Indian legislatures. With political violence reaching unprecedented levels in the early 1930s, colonial officials became increasingly reliant on repressive emergency laws that for the first time began to target ‘terrorism’ as a distinct category of crime.
Well-functioning governments are at the basis of a modern, democratic society, the rule of law and a market process that generates trust, opportunities, prosperity and freedom. To maintain the economic success of advanced economies and the trust of our citizens, governments need to do well on their core tasks: setting sound rules of the game in the market economy and providing high-quality, essential public goods and services. These include security, education, infrastructure, basic social safety nets, the environment and sound public finances. Public expenditure is an important tool in this regard, but more spending is not correlated with more trust – ‘better’ spending and better performance on core tasks is. This chapter also sets out the map of the book: How public spending has evolved over time and how it has been financed in Part I; government performance and efficiency, the role of expenditure reforms and the ‘optimal’ size of government in Part II; the main fiscal risks in the social and financial sphere in Part III; and the case for strong rules and institutions to govern public spending and limit fiscal risks in the concluding Part IV.
This chapter analyzes the discussions surrounding the proposed Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism at the League of Nations in 1937. While the importance of this convention is often downplayed within the existing scholarship, the debates of the 1930s provide key insight into the origins of terrorism as a legal and political idea rooted in the international context of the interwar period. A closer look at India's role in this convention provides new and important ways of understanding the larger context in which colonial officials framed their ideas about terrorism as a new and particularly dangerous form of global criminality, a ‘world crime’ that threatened not only the governing structures of an existing political regime, but rather the very notion of civilization itself.
The EU has spearheaded innovative legislation in 2019 to promote the financing of economic activities to tackle climate change. But the social aspects of tackling climate and environmental problems have received inadequate attention in the legislation. This has resulted in inconsistent legal definitions and unelaborated processes to ensure all economic and climate tackling activities are socially sustainable. In many cases climate changing activities have resulted from, or been combined with, breaching social and human rights. Providing opportunities to citizens and communities to (financially) redress environmental problems is important for a just transition. An integrated approach whereby ESG risks and long term impacts are integrated in all banking and investment decision-making should be urgently taken up by the Commission. Building on existing international standards, voluntary codes and expertise in the EU’s social sector would help to meet the existing challenges. Such EU policy should also be integrated in the EU’s international trade and investment treaties that create the competition from financial players outside the EU which might not integrate an ESG approach.
A number of philosophical doctrines developed as responses to some mainstream views of the Iberian colonial period (roughly, from the late 1500s to the early 1800s). Chapter 1 of this book looks closely at four such doctrines whose central themes concerning Latin America can be traced to that period. It first examines the ideas of three Spanish thinkers, Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-1566), Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), and José de Acosta (ca. 1539-1600). The chapter demonstrates that Las Casas and Vitoria were set to determine the moral status of the Spanish conquest, and developed novel doctrines of practical ethics and political philosophy. Acosta raised empiricist objections to Scholasticism in epistemology and philosophy of science. Pressured by the new physical and social realities of the Americas, these three thinkers were among the early challengers of Thomism as interpreted in the Spanish world during the sixteenth century. But the chapter also examines what Edmundo O’Gorman (Mexican, 1906-1995) argued more recently against the myth of Columbus’ “discovery” of America. Clearly, the end of the colonial period was far from marking the end of reflection on philosophically interesting aspects of the Iberian expansion.
This final chapter outlines the contours of a Christian political theology of law as an indirect and provisional witness to the divine rule, before considering how this approach might engage with Sunni political theology. The chapter develops a theological account of public law as a site of contestation where provisional and indirect witness to God’s rule is at stake. The law is a witness because it is never able to be or to usher in the rule of God; it is indirect because public law should be minimally concerned with the truth about God’s identity and nature; it is provisional since the law is always in need of critique and reevaluation and can never be finally settled. Following the comparative hermeneutic that has guided this book, the chapter then shows how such a theo-legal vision might engage with certain aspects of classical, modern, and contemporary Sunni Islamic thought and prove a productive framework for further debate and dialogue on three key issues in modern Islamic thought: (1) the nature of divine sovereignty and public law, (2) the distinctions between sharī’a and fiqh, and (3) the relationship between maqaṣid (the higher aims of the law), maṣlaḥa, and fiqh.
Public administration in Norway and in many other countries has used computers for more than fifty-five years. It is normal and necessary. Of course, it is possible to imagine many more office buildings where thousands of men and women would do all the detailed processing of individual cases that are processed today by computers, but this alternative is not very realistic: Modern taxation systems, national social insurance schemes and management of many other welfare programs would not be feasible without the use of computers and the algorithmic law that is integrated in the software. Thus, the question is not if public administration should apply computer technology, but how this should be done. This chapter deals with important how-to questions.
The United States’ transition from an economy built on form contracts to an economy built on algorithmic contracts has been as subtle as it has been thorough. In the form contract economy, many firms used standard order forms to make and receive orders. Firms purchased products and services with lengthy terms of services. Even negotiated agreements between fairly sophisticated businesses involved heavy incorporation of standard form terms selected by lawyers.
This chapter argues that the partial automation of managerial authority should not matter when determining whether platform workers are—or should be treated as—employees or independent contractors under the law. It offers a close reading of an end-user license agreement (EULA) between the on-demand transportation company Uber and its drivers. In particular, the chapter examines the relationship between the EULA and Uber’s use of algorithmic management to design, direct, monitor, evaluate, and compensate drivers’ work. By scrutinizing this relationship through a theory of the “self” implicit in contract law, the chapter shows that the EULA grants Uber rights to direct drivers’ work and determine the principal terms of the agreement as it goes along. This unilateral discretion is difficult to reconcile with what the law expects of an enforceable contract. Rather, it resembles the open-ended authority that the law permits an employer over its employees. Uber exercises its extra-contractual discretion through the App. Algorithmic management enables Uber continually to recalibrate its putative bargain with drivers to the company’s advantage. One lesson of this analysis is that decision makers tasked with evaluating the employment status of platform workers should take more seriously the contractual component of being an “independent contractor.”
Digital information and communications technologies (ICT) have been enthusiastically adopted by individuals, businesses, and government, altering the texture of commercial, social, and legal relationships in profound ways. In this decade, with the rapid development of “big data,” machine-learning tools, and the “Internet of Things,” it is clear that algorithms are becoming very important elements of modern society and a significant factor to consider when developing political or business strategies, developing new markets, or trying to solve problems.
The debate over algorithmic decision-making has focused primarily on two things: legal accountability and bias. Legal accountability seeks to leverage the institutions of law and compliance to put guard rails around the use of artificial intelligence (AI). This literature insists that if a state is going to use an algorithm to evaluate teachers or if a bank is going to use AI to make loan application decisions, both should do so transparently, in accordance with fair procedure, and be subject to interrogation. Algorithmic fairness seeks to highlight the ways in which AI discriminates on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity, among other protected characteristics. This literature calls for making technologies that use AI, whether search engines or digital cameras, more inclusive by better training AI on diverse inputs and improving automated systems that have been shown to have a “disparate impact” on marginalized populations.
There are two dominant approaches to Christian engagement with Islamic ethics, both of which hinder understanding of sharī‘a, fiqh, and their place in Islamic political discourse. One claims Islam is theocratic and necessarily in competition with Christian views of the distinction between the spiritual and earthly. This perspective depicts Islam and Christianity as locked in a clash of religions that is rooted in the core scriptural and theological identities of both communities. The second approach understands Islam to be trapped by its past, but nonetheless able to evolve, as Christianity did in the West, through adopting secularism. Islam is at its core a religion of peace, but this truth is best realized when Islam follows the lead of secular liberalism by privatizing religion. Neither approach amounts to an honest engagement with Muslims’ own differing and diverse accounts of the importance of sharī‘a and the moral world that it imagines and ritually enacts. By relegating sharī‘a to only absolutist law, Christian theological engagement with Islam forgoes opportunities for genuine dialogue, mutual learning, and constructive disagreement in political theology.
This chapter offers an overview of the legal and regulatory landscape impacting gig work in America. It covers recent developments in case law and legislation at city, state, and federal levels, as well as regulatory activity involving administrative actors like the National Labor Relations Board. The legal landscape described here provides the background for the chapters that follow. It argues that there are in fact far fewer laws regulating gig work than one might expect because of the newness of this type of labor exchange, preemption rules that make it difficult for local (and sometimes state) authorities to regulate work, and because non-work issues – consumer protection, taxation, urban infrastructure – have tended to occupy regulators’ attention.