The political processes behind decisions to adopt CCT programs shows that presidents in Latin America, during the period under study in this book, pursued their antipoverty agendas taking into account the reactions of legislators. This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the role of executive-legislative relations in the adoption and design of CCTs. The chapter begins with a quantitative analysis of the determinants of the adoption of CCTs with stringent operational guidelines and the adoption of CCTs with lax operational rules.

Then, to further test the plausibility of the argument, the chapter explores the emergence of CCT programs in five countries in Latin America. I first review the origins of Mexico's Progresa program, followed by a discussion of the Colombian CCT program, Familias en Acción. In both countries, the president faced antagonistic legislatures controlled by legislators of their own party but from different within-party factions. I then review the origins of Guatemala's Mi Familia Progresa and Peru's Juntos program, where presidents faced legislatures controlled by the opposition. Finally, I examine Argentina's CCT program, Plan Familias, implemented first when the president's party controlled congress, and I examine Asignación Universal por Hijo, implemented when the president no longer controlled congress. The quantitative evidence and qualitative insights support the argument that when the president faces an antagonistic legislature, he opts for designing and adopting programs with operational rules that suppress their own, and other politicians', discretion.

THE ADOPTION AND DESIGN OF LATIN AMERICAN CCTS, 1990–2011

Presidents' decisions about the adoption, or not, of a CCT with stringent or lenient design is a function of the alignment of the president's interests with those of legislators. A president whose interests are in line with those of legislators designs and adopts a policy with fewer rules that would limit his own control over the policy's implementation. In contrast, a president who faces resistance in congress designs and adopts a policy with more operational rules that suppress discretion.