Since the early 1990s, governments in Latin America have been experimenting with innovative approaches to poverty alleviation. The programs that have been created in the region have garnered the attention of scholars and policy-makers worldwide. During this wave of social policy reform, the uncelebrated breakthrough in the fight against poverty is that some presidents in the region have adopted programs whose operational guidelines – such as fixed eligibility criteria, monitoring systems, and independent program evaluations – limit governments' ability to manipulate programs for political gain. Yet not all presidents in Latin America have adopted such programs. Why did some governments pursue poverty relief programs insulated from politics, while others pursued manipulable programs, and yet others did not reform their policies at all? What are the implications of this variation for the prospects of eradicating poverty in the region?

This book examines the political processes that led some governments to tie their own hands in crafting antipoverty programs. The degree to which executives limited their discretion had implications for various policy outcomes, including the life span of programs, the extent to which antipoverty policies were used as political instruments, and, ultimately, the degree to which programs improved the lives of the poor.

I argue that while economic crises create the conditions for a new pro-poor social coalition, the governments of young democracies adopt poverty alleviation programs whose operational rules suppress political discretion when they face an antagonistic legislature. Such a decision improves the programs' effectiveness in promoting social development. These policy outcomes, in turn, strengthen democratic systems by eroding clientelism and promoting the electoral participation of program recipients. Conversely, when governments' interests are aligned with those of legislators, poverty relief programs do not include such provisions, politicians have more opportunities to politicize a program, and efforts to fight poverty are less effective. These policy outcomes are deleterious to democracy because they reinforce clientelism, and thus hinder the ability of poor voters to hold politicians accountable.