Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Epistemology and Methodology in Ethics
  • Cited by 14
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
May 2020
Print publication year:
2020
Online ISBN:
9781108581493
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581493
Series:
Elements in Ethics
Subjects:
Ethics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

This Element introduces several prominent themes in contemporary work on the epistemology and methodology of ethics. Topics addressed include skeptical challenges in ethics, epistemic arguments in metaethics, what (if anything) is epistemically distinctive of the ethical. Also considered are methodological questions in ethics, including questions about which ethical concepts we should investigate, and what our goals should be in ethical inquiry.

References

Bibliography

Alston, W. (2005). Beyond “Justification.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Anderson, E. (2017). Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/feminism-epistemology/.
Audi, R. (2004). The Good in the Right, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Baker, D. (2018). The Varieties of Normativity. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 567–81.
Bedke, M. S. (2010). “Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.” Philosophy Compass, 5(12), 1069–83.
Bedke, M. S. (2018). Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 292–307.
Bengson, J. (2015). “The Intellectual Given.’ Mind, 124(495): 707–60.
Boghossian, P. (1996). “Analyticity Reconsidered.” Noûs, 30(3): 360–91.
Bolinger, R. (2018). The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting (Some) Racial Generalizations. Synthese.
Brandt, R. (1992). Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burgess, A. (2020). Never Say “Never.” In Burgess, A., Cappelan, H., & Plunkett, D., eds., Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 125–131.
Burgess, A. & Plunkett, D. (2013). “Conceptual Ethics I.” Philosophy Compass, 8(12): 1091–1101.
Caruso, G. (2018). Skepticism about Moral Responsibility. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/.
Chignell, A. (2018). The Ethics of Belief. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/.
Christensen, D. (2007). “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” The Philosophical Review, 116(2): 187–217.
Christensen, D. (2010). “Higher-Order Evidence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1): 185–215.
Cohen, S. (2016). “Theorizing about the Epistemic.” Inquiry, 59(7–8): 839–57.
Copp, D. (1991). “Moral Skepticism.” Philosophical Studies, 62(3): 203–33.
Copp, D. (2008). “Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism.” Philosophical Issues, 18(1): 186–206.
Copp, D. (2012). Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory. In Landau, R. S., ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–36.
Cowan, R. (2015). “Perceptual Intuitionism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), 164–93.
Cuneo, T.& Shafer-Landau, R. (2014). “The Moral Fixed Points.” Philosophical Studies, 171(3): 399–443.
Darwall, S. (2018). Ethics and Morality. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 552–66.
Descartes, R. (1984). Philosophical Writings Vol. 2. Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D., trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dorr, C. (2002). “Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.” Noûs, 36(1): 97–103.
Dunaway, W. (2018). Realism and Objectivity. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 135–50.
Eklund, M. (2017). Choosing Normative Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, D. (2006). “Agency, Shmagency.” Philosophical Review, 115(2): 169–98.
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Faraci, D. (2015). “A Hard Look at Moral Perception.” Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2055–72.
Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Fine, K. (2001). “The Question of Realism.” Philosophers’ Imprint, 1(1): 1–30.
Foley, R. (2001). Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fritz, J. (2017). “Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(51), 643–61.
Fritz, J. & McPherson, T. (2019). “Moral Steadfastness and Meta-Ethics.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(1): 43–55.
Geuss, R. (1981). The Idea of a Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gibbard, A. (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, A. & Blanchard, T. (2018). Social Epistemology. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epistemology-social/.
Greene, J. (2007). The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W., ed., Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality, vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 35–79.
Haidt, J. (2001). “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review, 108 (4): 814–34.
Hare., R. M. (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hasan, A. & Fumerton, R. (2018). Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/.
Haslanger, S. (2012). Resisting Reality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hills, A. (2009). “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.” Ethics, 120(1): 94–127.
Hooker, B. (2000). Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hopkins, R. (2007). “What Is Wrong with Moral Testimony?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(3): 611–34.
Horn, J. (2017). “Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability.” Journal of Value Inquiry, 51(3): 363–81.
Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Huemer, M. (2007). “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 30–55.
Huemer, M. (2008). “Revisionary Intuitionism.” Social Philosophy and Policy, 25(1): 368–92.
Jackson, F.& Pettit, P. (1995). “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation.” Philosophical Quarterly, 45(178): 20–40.
Johnston, M. (2001). “The Authority of Affect.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1): 181–214.
Jones, K. (1999). “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy, 96(2): 55–78.
Jones, K. (2006). Moral Epistemology. In Jackson, F. & Smith, M., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63–85.
Joyce, R. (2006). The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Kagan, S. (2001). Thinking About Cases. In Paul, E. F., Miller, F. D., & Paul, J., eds., Moral Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahane, G. (2011). “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” Noûs, 45(1): 103–25.
Kauppinen, A. (2018). Moral Sentimentalism. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/moral-sentimentalism/.
Kim, B. (2017). “Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.” Philosophy Compass, 12(5).
Kelly, T. (2003). “Epistemic Rationality As Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3): 612–40.
Kelly, T. (2005). “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?” Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1): 179–209.
Klein, P. (2015). Skepticism. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/.
Korsgaard, C. (1996). Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lillehammer, H. (2007). Companions in Guilt. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Lutz, M.& Ross, J. (2018). Moral Skepticism. In McPherson, T. and Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 484–98.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1970). The German Ideology. Lough, W., trans., Arthur, C. J., ed. New York: International Publishers.
May, J. (2014). “Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1): 125–41.
McGrath, S. (2004). “Moral Knowledge by Perception.” Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1): 209–28.
McGrath, S. (2008). Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise. In Shafer-Landau, R., ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–108.
McGrath, S. (2011). “Skepticism about Moral Expertise As a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophy, 108(3): 111–37.
McPherson, T. (2009). “Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 3(1).
McPherson, T. (2012). “Unifying Moral Methodology.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(4): 523–49.
McPherson, T. (2015a). A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore? In Bramble, B. & Fischer, R., The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118–34.
McPherson, T. (2015b). The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium. In Daly, C., ed., The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 652–74.
McPherson, T. (2015c). Open Question Argument. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/open-question-argument/v-1.
McPherson, T. (2015d). “What Is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?” Noûs, 49(1): 123–46.
McPherson, T. (2018a). Authoritatively Normative Concepts. In Shafer-Landau, R., ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253–77.
McPherson, T. (2018b). Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental Epistemology. In Jones, K. & Schroeter, F., eds., The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 187–209.
McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D. (2018). The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 1–25.
McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D. (2020). Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Ethical Inquiry. In Burgess, A., Cappelan, H., & Plunkett, D., eds., Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 274–303.
McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D. (Forthcoming). Evaluation Turned on Itself. In R. Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, G. E. (1903). “The Refutation of Idealism.” Mind, 12(48): 433–53.
Moore, G. E. (1993 [1903]). Principia Ethica. Baldwin, T., ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, G. E. (1959). Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond Good and Evil. Kaufmann, W., trans. & ed. New York: Random House.
Olson, J. (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Olsson, E. (2017). Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justep-coherence/.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollock, J. L. & Cruz, J. (1999) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Pritchard, D. Turri, J. & Carter, J. A. (2018). The Value of Knowledge. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/knowledge-value/.
Pryor, J. (2000). “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” Noûs 34(4): 517–49.
Railton, P. (2003). Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999a). The Independence of Moral Theory. In Collected Papers, Freeman, S., ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 286–302.
Rawls, J. (1999b). A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Rosen, G. (2018). Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 151–69.
Ross, J. (2006). “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism.” Ethics 116(4): 742–68.
Ross, W. D. (2002 [1930]). The Right and the Good. Stratton-Lake, P., ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Royzman, E. B. Kim, K., & Leeman, R. F. (2015). “The Curious Tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the Moral Dumbfounding Effect.” Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4): 296–313.
Russell, B. [Bertrand]. (2009 [1948]). Human Knowledge. New York: Routledge.
Russell, B. [Bruce]. (2017). A Priori Justification and Knowledge. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori/.
Rysiew, R. (2016). Epistemic Contextualism. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
Sampson, E. (2019). The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement. In Shafer-Landau, R., ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23–46.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Schechter, J. (2018). Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 443–58.
Schroeder, M. (2010). Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. New York: Routledge.
Sepielli, A. (2019). Decision-Making Under Moral Uncertainty. In Zimmerman, A., Jones, K., & Timmons, M., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge, 508–21.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shah, N. (2010). “The Limits of Normative Detachment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 110(3): 347–71.
Sidgwick, H. (1981 [1907]). Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Singer, S. (2005). “Ethics and Intuitions.” The Journal of Ethics, 9(3/4): 331–52.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006). Moral Skepticisms. New York: OUP
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing Moral Intuitions. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W., ed., Moral Psychology, vol. 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 47–76.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2011). An Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism. In Hernandez, J. G., ed., The New Intuitionism. New York: Continuum, 11–28.
Sliwa, P. (2012). “In defense of Moral Testimony.” Philosophical Studies, 158 (2): 175–95.
Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
Smithies, D. (2019). The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Star, D. (2008). “Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism.” Ratio, 21(3): 329–43.
Stojanovic, I. (2018). Metaethical Relativism. In McPherson, T. & Plunkett, D., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge, 119–32.
Street, S. (2006). “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies, 127(1): 109–66.
Street, S. (2008). “Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About.” Philosophical Issues, 18(1): 207–28.
Thomson, J. J. (1985). “The Trolley Problem.” The Yale Law Journal, 94(6): 1395–1415.
Tobin, T. W.& Jaggar, A. M. (2013). “Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology.” Metaphilosophy, 44(4): 409–39.
Turri, J., Alfano, M. & Greco, J. (2018). Virtue Epistemology. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epistemology-virtue/.
Vavova, K. (2018). “Irrelevant Influences.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1): 134–52.
Vayrynen, P. (2018). Doubts about Moral Perception. In Bergqvist, A. & Cowan, R., eds., Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–28.
Wedgwood, R. (2014). Moral Disagreement among Philosophers. In Bergmann, M. & Kain, P., eds., Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23–39.
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolff, R. P. (1970). In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper & Row.
Zagzebski, L. (2012). Epistemic Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, A. (2010). Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.