The specific maximin structure of the Hedonic Maximin Principle is mandated by the direct argument of the last chapter. It may seem intuitively troubling in various respects. But this chapter argues that such a structure is in fact in appropriate concord with commonsense normative intuitions of the same level of generality and abstraction. You may be initially disinclined to believe this. So was I. But please bear with me, since I hope to surprise you. In the next chapter, we will consider the detailed normative implications of this structure in conjunction with hedonism and Multiple-Act Consequentialism, and see that they are also properly intuitive.

There are three controversial elements of this structure. First, it is a maximin structure, which gives special preference to the maximization of the well-being of the worst-off, regardless of the cost to others who will remain nevertheless relatively better-off. Second, it considers distribution not over individual lives but rather over individual moments of lives, and indeed, to be precise, over individual bits of individual moments of lives, over flecks of experience. Third, it incorporates a maximin treatment of risks, and hence is very risk-averse.

Sections I, II, and III concern the plausibility of flecks of moments of lives as the basic locus of moral concern. Section IV concerns maximin. Section V concerns risk aversion. Section VI traces relevant interactions of these three structural elements.

Entire lives are perhaps the customary basic locus of concern in moral theory.