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How the Weak Win Wars
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Book description

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.


'Arreguín-Toft has made a major contribution to the literature on a fascinating and very timely subject. How the Weak Win Wars should be required reading not only for International Relations scholars but also for would be US presidents who still do not grasp the limits of American military power now on display in Iraq.'

Source: Survival

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

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