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  • Cited by 7
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    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Dasgupta, Hirak 2017. Enhancing Academic Research With Knowledge Management Principles. p. 200.

    Schalkwyk, David 2017. Cavell, Wittgenstein, Shakespeare, and Skepticism: Othello vs. Cymbeline. Modern Philology, Vol. 114, Issue. 3, p. 601.

    Tozzi, Arturo and Peters, James F. 2017. Towards Topological Mechanisms Underlying Experience Acquisition and Transmission in the Human Brain. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, Vol. 51, Issue. 2, p. 303.

    Bäckström, Stina 2017. What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 358.

    Karlinsky-Shichor, Yael and Zviran, Moshe 2016. Factors Influencing Perceived Benefits and User Satisfaction in Knowledge Management Systems. Information Systems Management, Vol. 33, Issue. 1, p. 55.

    Berlant, Lauren 2015. Structures of Unfeeling: Mysterious Skin. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 28, Issue. 3, p. 191.

    Simon, Roger I. 2011. A shock to thought: Curatorial judgment and the public exhibition of ‘difficult knowledge’. Memory Studies, Vol. 4, Issue. 4, p. 432.

  • Print publication year: 2002
  • Online publication date: June 2012

IX - Knowing and Acknowledging


It is, I believe, generally assumed—certainly it is natural to assume—that the philosophical appeal to ordinary language constitutes some sort of immediate repudiation of traditional philosophy, in particular of that continuous strain or motive within traditional philosophy which is roughly characterizable as skepticism (a strain or motive which most clearly includes elements of Cartesianism and of British Empiricism). This formulation is vague enough, and the assumption I refer to, if I am right that it is there, is itself vague enough. It would be the latest in the long history of altering relations which philosophy, as it alters, will draw between itself and common sense or everyday belief or the experience or the ordinary man. And the specific terms of criticism in which one philosophy formulates its opposition to another philosophy or to everyday beliefs is as definitive of that philosophy as any of the theses it may produce. I wish in what follows to suggest that so far as the appeal to what we should ordinariiy say is taken to provide an immediate repudiation of skepticism, that appeal is itself repudiated.

The usefulness, not to say the authority, of appeals to what we should ordinarily say, as philosophical data, depends upon their being met in independence of any particular philosophical position or theory. (This is, I take it, what the phrase “ordinary language” meant to its Oxford coiners: a view of words free of philosophical preoccupation.)

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Must We Mean What We Say?
  • Online ISBN: 9780511811753
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