Invited to speak at the opening of the Second Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law, which focused on International Law in a Multi-Polar and Multi-Civilizational World: Asian Perspectives, Challenges, and Contributions, I had to reflect on the specific contributions our regional societies supposedly bring to international law. More specifically, the underlying idea was that of a regional vision or approach to international law which could be more or less rooted in a tradition. I soon realized that our regional societies could be viewed in a rather ambiguous or ambivalent way, since they could be seen as a means of promoting a regional vision as well as a means of enabling people to meet beyond the domestic scope, which is the horizon of most academics, if not practitioners, to share their views on international law at large. The two views are not entirely incompatible but they do not carry exactly the same spirit regarding the purpose of regional societies.

The ambivalence originates in the necessity we feel to justify our own existence. On the one hand, we can be very pragmatic and point out that the regional level, empirically conceived, is a sort of “critical” level to organize events and network. National is not enough any more for most countries. Global is too much. Regional is, let us say, practicable.

This article traces the development of the definition of “investment” under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. It proposes that the definition should act as an outer limit to the usually broad definition of investment (encompassing every kind of asset) in international investment agreements (IIAs). The article discusses the various characteristics (hallmarks) of an investment which should constitute the definition. It argues that the hallmark of “significant contribution to economic development” can be refined to reduce uncertainty while giving effect to the intent of the ICSID contracting states by drawing a distinction between an ordinary commercial transaction and an investment. Recent IIA definitions of investment adopting Salini hallmarks show that states adopt the “every kind of asset” definition of investment in IIAs out of a concern that the form which the investment may take should not be restricted and that states do not necessarily view the Salini hallmarks as unwelcome.

Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol imposes an obligation only on certain developed countries, working through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), to pursue the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from marine bunker fuels. The IMO recently took the initiative to adopt a new legal instrument for the reduction of ship-generated greenhouse gas emissions. Some developing countries have suggested that the proposed IMO initiative should strictly adhere to Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). Against this backdrop, this article intends to review the extent to which it is possible to propose an international legal instrument for the reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker fuels which is applicable only to ships from developed countries considering the complex characteristics of the international shipping industry. This article also examines how far this approach is justifiable even within the framework of the CBDR principle.

The conflict between ethical universalism and cultural diversity remains a pre-eminent problem of the present international legal system. International law is in a dilemma. It cannot abstain from adopting some material values as the international community cannot be indifferent to the suppressions of citizens or certain minorities by totalitarian regimes. Yet the international legal system must not become an instrument of Western cultural imperialism by negating any cultural differences. This contribution argues that international law is a framework concept prescribing certain basic values. However, these values are not absolute and must be balanced against competing interests. In this balancing process, states have considerable political discretion. This concept will be exemplified by an analysis of the debate on the existence of a right to democratic governance in international law. It will be shown that even though international law does not require states to be democratic, it nevertheless imposes certain standards of legitimacy.

In April 2008, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) was informed of the possible downgrading of its “A” status within the UN system, due to its apparent failure to comply with the Paris Principles relating to the status of national human rights institutions. This article explores this threat to downgrade SUHAKAM and the actions which it stimulated on the part of the Malaysian government and SUHAKAM itself. It argues that despite expectations by government and civil society at the time of its establishment, SUHAKAM has directly challenged government on major human rights issues on a number of occasions. At the same time, it has had difficulty persuading government to give effect to its recommendations and has as a consequence drawn strong criticism from civil society for failing to protect human rights that are within the government’s power to rectify.